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Abstract 
Drawing on the theory of contracts and Schumpeterian models of innovation, we argue that 
direct public support for business R&D may deliver sub-optimal outcomes if firms are risk-
averse and have private information about their R&D productivity. Using observable proxies 
for risk aversion and R&D productivity, we report that the average treatment effect (ATT) in 
the sample of sample of 43,650 British firms is positive but highly heterogenous. The ATTs 
tend to be: (a) insignificant or negligible when the perceived risk of R&D investment is high 
due to crisis episodes or because of investment in basic research; (b) insignificant among larger 
and older firms and firms closer to the R&D frontier; and (c) positive and larger than the 
average among small and young firms and firms further away from the R&D frontier. Our 
findings point out to conundrums in the use of R&D subsidies as an innovation policy tool: 
The case for R&D subsidies is stronger during economic downturns, when the investment is in 
basic R&D and when firms have a higher probability of innovation success; but the subsidy is 
less likely to increase business R&D under these conditions.  
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Information asymmetry, risk aversion and R&D subsidies: 
Effect-size heterogeneity and policy conundrums  
 
1. Introduction 
The case for public funding of business R&D is based on the existence of an R&D gap, which 
reflects the extent to which a firm’s actual level of R&D investment is below the socially 
optimal level because of market failures. One type of market failure is due to imperfect 
appropriability of the innovation benefits (Arrow, 1962; 1996; Romer, 1990). The other results 
from financial market imperfections. The latter are exacerbated by the severity of the 
information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard problems; and impose a financial 
constraint on innovative firms (Bloom et al., 2007; Czarnitzki and Toole, 2007; Hall, 1992; 
2002; 2010; Minton and Schrand, 1999). The insights from these theoretical perspectives enjoy 
considerable empirical support and have long informed policy choices in favour of public 
subsidies for business R&D investment.  
 
Nevertheless, economic theory also suggests that the R&D gap depends on the balance between 
two opposite effects: the investment-deterring effect of knowledge spillovers and capital-
market imperfections versus the investment-inducing effects of creative destruction and 
market-stealing dynamics unleashed by intra-industry innovation (Bloom et al., 2019).. 
Secondly, knowledge spillovers and R&D investment may be complementary or substitutes. 
Complementarity is more likely if firms must invest in R&D (build up absorptive capacity) to 
benefit from knowledge externalities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Geroski, 1995a; Branstetter 
and Sakakibara, 1998).  Hence, the effects of R&D subsidies on business R&D investment 
would differ, depending on the balance the deterrence and inducement effects of investment in 
innovation and the extent to which absorptive capacity is necessary for benefiting from R&D 
externalities. More importantly, however, public support would have heterogeneous effects on 
firm effort (including R&D investment), depending on the level of information asymmetries 
between the funder and funded firms and the risk aversion of the latter (Laffont and Martimort, 
2002; Akcigit et al., 2019). Risk aversion is also an important determinant of R&D investment 
in Schumpeterian and third-generation models of innovation and growth (Aghion et al., 2014; 
2015; Akcigit and Kerr, 2018; Strulik, 2007), where R&D intensity decreases with the firm’s 




Effect-size heterogeneity has been acknowledged and discussed in the policy evaluation 
literature reviewed below. However, the existing explanations have remained fragmented; and 
reflect a tendency of over reliance on the incentive effects of R&D subsidies through cost 
reduction or relaxation of the financing constraint. Furthermore, there is a tendency to overlook 
the implications of information asymmetries between the funders and funded firms; and 
whether the responsiveness of the R&D investment to policy interventions varies by different 
R&D types associated with different levels of return uncertainty. The aim of this paper is to 
accord theory a more prominent role in predicting and explaining the variations in the effect of 
R&D subsidies on business R&D investment.  
 
To achieve this aim, we first draw on theory of contracts (Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Akcigit 
et al., 2019) to demonstrate why the effect of subsidy on business R&D investment is a second-
best outcome, why subsidy allocations may remain sub-optimal, and how information 
asymmetry and risk aversion impinge on the relationship between R&D subsidies and business 
R&D investment. Then, we draw on Schumpeterian and third-generation models of innovation 
and growth (Aghion et al., 2014; 2015; Akcigit et al., 2019; Strulik,  2007) to demonstrate how 
theoretical constructs such as R&D gap, R&D productivity and risk aversion that are 
unobservable for the funder and the researcher can be proxied by observed variables related to 
firm age, size and R&D intensity, R&D type and downturns in the business cycle. Finally, we 
utilise a novel treatment-effect estimator based on the entropy balancing (EB), which  ensures 
a high degree of covariate balance between the treatment and the control groups up to three 
moment conditions: mean, variance, and skewness (Hainmueller, 2012).1 
 
Our findings provide strong and consistent support to the theoretical insights from the theory 
of contracts and Schumpeterian models of innovation. The ATT is smaller when R&D 
investment is associated with higher return volatility/uncertainty, as it is the case when the 
investment is in basic R&D or it is undertaken during periods of the dot-com crisis from 2000 
to 2002 or the global financial crisis from 2008 to 2010. The ATT for all types of R&D inputs 
is positive in the full sample, but this conceals a high degree of heterogeneity. The effect is 
 
1 A major advantage of the EB estimator is that it does not depend on a propensity score model, the correct 
specification of which is a major challenge. A recent evaluation study reports that the EB routine is one of the 
top-5 performers of twenty popular estimators in terms of root means square error (RMSE) and coverage of the 
true treatment effect, while the propensity score estimators are not (Dorie et al., 2019). 
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positive and larger than the average among young and small firms and firms further away from 
the R&D frontier,  which receive only 10 percent of the total subsidy or less; but it is 
insignificant among older and larger firms and firms closer to the R&D frontier, which receive 
90 percent of the total subsidy or more. Effect-size heterogeneity with respect to firm type 
holds for all R&D input types considered.  
 
The findings and their robustness to a range of sensitivity checks reveal inherent conundrums 
in public support for business R&D. On the one hand, it appears socially optimal to provide 
public support for basic research, during economic downturns, and when firms are more likely 
to convert R&D inputs into profitable innovations. On the other hand, public subsidies are less 
likely to generate additionality effects under these conditions because: (i) the firms’ R&D 
investment is less sensitive to the subsidy when R&D return uncertainty is high either due to 
low market readiness of basic R&D or because of increased product market uncertainties 
associated with crisis periods; and (ii) large and old firms and firms closer to the R&D frontier 
have narrower R&D gaps and are more likely to extract informational rents by concealing their 
true types in terms of R&D productivity and R&D gap. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we review the relevant literature to 
document the extent of heterogeneity in reported effect-size estimates and make the case for 
an ex ante theoretical framework that can shed light on the sources of heterogeneity in the 
empirical findings. Section 3 discusses the funding regime in the UK, spells out the information 
asymmetries it may entail, and draws on the theory of contracts and Schumpeterian models of 
innovation to demonstrate why R&D return uncertainty and firm age, size and distance to R&D 
frontier can be used as predictors of the variation in the subsidy’s effects on R&D investment.  
In section 4, we present our dataset and empirical strategy. We first provide evidence on the 
treated and untreated samples, the percentage of firms in receipt of government subsidy, the 
funding rate, and the distribution of the public subsidy by firm age and size deciles. Then we 
discuss the EB methodology and the wide range of pre-treatment covariates that we balance to 
eliminate bias in the estimations of the treatment effects from observational data. The empirical 
results are presented in section 5, complemented with additional sensitivity and balancing 






2.   Effect-size heterogeneity in the literature  
Following the pioneering work by Blank and Stigler (1957), a growing number of studies have 
utilised a variety of datasets and estimation methods to establish whether public support for 
business R&D has complementary or substitution effects. David et al. (2000) review 14 firm-
level studies, of which three reported additionality effects, five studies based on US data 
reported crowding-out effects, and the remaining six reported mixed findings. Additionality 
effects are more likely to be reported by studies based on continental European data. This is 
the case in Czatrnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013) on the effect of R&D subsidies in Flanders; 
Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) and Hussinger (2008) in Germany; Duguet (2004) in France; 
and Aerts and Schmidt (2008) covering both German and Flemish firms. However, effect-size 
estimates are heterogeneous even among studies using European data (Czarnitzki and Toole, 
2007; Hud and Hussinger, 2015; Takalo et al., 2013).  
 
Effect-size heterogeneity is related to firm size and age in several studies. For example, Marino 
et al., (2016) investigate the effect of subsidies on private R&D expenditures in a sample of 
French firms and report that the effect varies by the subsidy rate and by firm size. The 
crowding-out effect is more prevalent among small firms and firms in receipt of large and 
medium-sized subsidies. In contrast, Gonzalez and Pazo (2008) and Lach (2002) report that 
small firms are more likely to be associated with additionality effects. Larger additionality 
effects among small firms is also reported in a more recent study by Venino et al., (2019), who 
find that R&D subsidies have larger output (employment and turnover) additionality effects 
among smaller firms. A similar finding is reported by Nilsen et al., (2018), who find that the 
output (value-added and revenue) additionality effects are larger among start-up firms 
compared to older firms. Crowding-out or weaker additionality effects among older firms are 
also reported in Aristei et al., (2017). The difference in the treatment effect is usually explained 
by differences in the severity of the financing constraint, which is assumed to be more biting 
among small or young firms (Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014).  
 
R&D type is another source of effect-size heterogeneity reported in the literature. For example, 
Aerts and Thorwarth (2008) report that R&D subsidies tend to reduce firm investment in basic 
as opposed to development research. In contrast, Clausen (2009) and Czarnitzki et al., (2011) 
report that R&D subsidies tend to have stronger additionality effects on investment in basic 
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research; and the effect on development research expenditures is either negative in the former 
or insignificant in the latter study. It seems that R&D subsidies are ineffective in generating 
additionality in the case of development R&D investment because firms already have stronger 
incentives to undertake such investment in projects that are closer to the market, face less return 
uncertainty, and have higher tangibility.  
 
Given this background, effect-size heterogeneity has been acknowledged by both narrative 
reviews and meta-analysis studies. For example, Garcia-Quevedo (2004) reviews 28 studies 
that utilize firm-level data and reports that seven studies find additionality, 10 studies find no 
significant effects, and 11 studies report crowding-out effects. In a meta-analysis study, Dimos 
and Pugh (2016) synthesize 660 effect-size estimates from 52 primary studies and report that 
the additionality effect that can be identified is positive but small and conceals a high degree 
of heterogeneity. Crowding-out or insignificant effects constitute about 45% of the evidence 
base, with the remaining 55% indicating additionality effects. A similar picture emerges from 
a systematic review of 168 effect-size estimates from 77 studies by Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 
(2014), where 40% of the reviewed findings indicate crowding-out or insignificant effects and 
60% indicate additionality effects. 
 
Zúñiga-Vicente et al., (2014) observe that the studies tend to focus on method development 
and exploring different country samples or time periods. As a result, the explanations for 
observed heterogeneity have remained patchy and unsystematic. To address this gap, the 
authors offer a number of assumptions about why the effect of R&D subsidies should be 
expected to vary by observable sources of heterogeneity such as the firm’s subsidy history, the 
time lag, the existence of financial constraints, the composition of the R&D investment, and 
the generosity and sources of the public subsidies. Their overall conclusion is that future 
research should be more systematic in modelling, estimating, and explaining these sources of 
heterogeneity to develop a better understanding of where and when R&D subsidies may or may 
not induce additionality effects.  
 
So far, four studies have attempted to identify the sources of the heterogeneity in the treatment 
effects in a systematic manner. Czatrnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013) is an empirical attempt at 
investigating whether the treatment effect varies over time, or by the number of grants received, 
or by multiplicity of the funding sources. The authors regress the treatment effects obtained 
from a propensity score estimator on dummy variables that capture the potential sources of 
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heterogeneity, and report that the effects do not vary over time or with the number of grants 
received or funding sources. Lach (2002) hypothesize that the subsidy’s effect on business 
R&D investment depends on innovation success probability and the marginal cost of hiring 
R&D personnel. If the funder prefers to fund projects with higher success probability, the scope 
for additionality effects is reduced because such projects might have been undertaken even 
without a subsidy. Furthermore, subsidised projects may crowd-out the financing of 
unsubsidised projects within the same firm if the marginal cost of hiring additional R&D 
personnel is high. Drawing on firms in Israel, Lach (2002) reports that the funding regime fails 
to create additionality because most subsidies are awarded to projects submitted by large firms, 
which would undertake those projects without the subsidy.  
 
Lee (2011) draws attention to the importance of firm size and argues that R&D subsidies are 
less likely to generate additionality effects among large firms. Crowding-out among large firms 
is explained by their proximity to the technology frontier, which leaves little need for catching 
up. In contrast, additionality effects among small firms are explained by their distance to the 
frontier and the need for catching up. Finally, Wanzenböck et al., (2013) identify three firm 
characteristics as potential sources of heterogeneity in behavioural additionality: R&D 
intensity/experience, technological specialization, and collaboration propensity. Their findings 
indicate that R&D-intensive firms are less likely to exhibit behavioural additionality because 
such firms have the capacity to undertake the desired R&D projects irrespective of public 
support.  
 
An issue common to these studies is that the theoretical framework that informs their testable 
hypotheses is either partial (i.e., it covers only a subset of the factors that moderate the 
relationship between the subsidy and the firm’s R&D effort) or it is developed in an eclectic 
manner - for example by juxtaposing the technological characteristics and collaboration 
propensities of the firms. We aim to transcend these limitations by focusing on the subsidy 
contract as a principal-agent setting and trace the implications of asymmetric information and 
risk aversion in that setting for the for the firm’s response to the R&D subsidy. The proposed 
approach is versatile enough to generate theoretically informed hypotheses on how the effect 
of the subsidy on business R&D investment is moderated by a wide range of firm 
characteristics, R&D types and the timing of the policy intervention. The moderating factors 





3. From the subsidy contract to R&D effect heterogeneity: The role of risk aversion and 
information asymmetry  
 
Our sample of firms receive direct public support form UK government departments, their 
agencies, and non-departmental public bodies like the Technology Strategy Board, including 
its successor, Innovate UK.2 They also receive funding from the European Union (EU) 
commission.3 Despite the involvement of multiple funders, two main features of the UK 
subsidy regime stand out. First, the largest part of the subsidies has been managed by non-
departmental agencies, of which Innovate UK is the incumbent. Secondly, the UK support for 
business R&D has to comply with the EU’s state-aid rules, under which R&D grants should 
not lead to unfair competition. The risk of unfair competition is measured by the proximity of 
the applicant’s project to its market operations – the so-called market readiness level (MRL). 
R&D activities that score 1 on the MRL scale such as basic research are furthest away from 
the market and qualify for public funding of up to 100% of the project costs (Table 1). The 
funding rate gradually declines for R&D activities closer to the market and varies between 
25%-70% of the project cost, depending on firm size.  
 











Micro (<10 employees) or 
Small (<50 employees) 
100% 70% 70% 45% 
Medium (<250 employees) 100% 60% 60% 35% 
Large (250+ employees) 100% 50% 50% 25% 
Source: Innovate UK4.   
To secure public funding, the applicant must demonstrate: (i) whether the project could be 
undertaken without public funding; (ii) the extent to which the project represents value for 
money for the taxpayer; and (iii) how the applicant will benefit from the innovation, including 
the latter’s impact on productivity and growth. In addition, the applicant must provide 
 
2 The non-departmental public agencies also include eight regional development agencies (RDAs), which 
also provided R&D funding from 2000 to 2012, but then discontinued.  
3 We investigate only the effects of UK subsidies on business R&D investment. To ensure identification of the 
UK subsidy’s effect, we obtain balance between treated and control firms with respect to whether the firm receives 
EU funding in addition to a wide set of covariates.  
9 
 
information about the scope for additionality by explaining why private finance may not be 
available for the project.4  
 
The firm’s planned R&D investment is observable to the funder because funding is conditional 
on the firm’s supply of information investment plans and project implementation within those 
plans. However, information asymmetry does exist with respect to three criteria important in 
the theory of contracts. One is the risk aversion in the firm’s decision-making for R&D 
investment, which determines the discount rate that the firm utilizes to select between R&D 
projects. The second is the firm’s R&D productivity defined as the success with which the firm 
converts R&D inputs into innovation outputs. The third is the firm’s R&D gap defined as the 
difference between the firm’s observed/actual level of R&D investment and the socially 
optimal level. Furthermore, the funder takes the existing intellectual property regime as given 
and does not monitor the firm’s price-costs margin.  
 
In the theory of contracts (Salanie, 2005; Laffont and Martimort, 2002), the consequences of 
the principal-agent relationships are analysed under the following behavioural assumptions: (i) 
the principal and the agent are rational and both maximize their utilities; (ii) the agent has 
private information about its type in terms of own productivity/efficiency, but the funder knows 
only the distribution of the agent types; and (iii) the principal moves first by offering R&D 
subsidy, while the agent accepts it if the offer satisfies its participation constraint.  
 
Under perfect information about the firm’s R&D productivity and perfect competition in the 
product market, the optimal (the first-best) subsidy that would maximise social welfare  is equal 
to a ‘Pigouvian correction’ for positive externalities (spillovers) from the firm’s own 
innovation. In this first-best scenario, the subsidy rate is just enough to correct for the incentive 
problem caused by imperfect appropriability of the innovation benefits. Stated differently, the 
funder does not have to offer an additional ‘screening premium’ to tease out information about 
the firm’s R&D productivity (hence its R&D gap) as this information is common knowledge. 
Additionally, the funder does not have to provide a ‘monopoly quality valuation correction’ 
premium because the firm is operating at the socially optimal level of output in a competitive 
industry.  
 
4 See Innovate UK, General guidance for grant applicants at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/innovate-uk-funding-




Under asymmetric information, however, the funder must augment the ‘Pigouvian correction’ 
with a ‘screening term’ aimed at inducing the high-productivity firms to reveal their true types 
(Akcigit et al., 2019). This Nash equilibrium outcome is determined by the participation 
constraint of the efficient firm and indicates a deviation from the first-best level of the subsidy. 
The funder satisfies the participation constraints of the high-R&D productivity firms to 
minimise the distortion of the subsidy allocations in favour of low-R&D-productivity firms. In 
the theory contracts, the magnitude of the screening term is an increasing function of the 
proportion of low-R&D-productivity firms in the applicant pool (Akcigit et al., 2019).  
 
When agents are heterogenous and correlation between their types is unknown, the high-R&D-
-productivity firm can mimic the low-productivity type and extract informational rents. This is 
because observed R&D investment would be only a noisy indicator of the firms’ unobserved 
R&D effort and productivity. Both Laffont and Martimort (2002) and Akcigit et al. (2019) 
demonstrate that monitoring an observed indicator of the unobserved effort does not enable the 
principal to elicit truthful information about the agents’ true type. A second source of deviation 
from the first-best subsidy is the lack of funder remit to monitor the subsidised firms’ pricing 
and output decisions. The funding agencies take the intellectual property protection regime 
(hence, the firm’s price-cost margin) as given. Therefore, the first-best subsidy is further 
augmented by a ‘monopoly quality valuation correction’, which is necessary to induce the firm 
to produce at the socially optimal level of output (Akcigit et al., 2019). Taken together, these 
deviations reflect a trade-off between efficiency gains from allocating subsidies to successful 
innovators and potential failure to induce additional R&D effort by high-R&D-productivity 
firms that would invest in R&D even in the absence of the subsidy. 
 
A third source of deviation from the first-best outcomes is the firm’s risk aversion that, for a 
given level of R&D productivity, implies a stronger participation constraint for risk-averse 
firms compared to risk-neutral firms. To satisfy the participation constraint of the risk-averse 
firms, the principal must offer a higher level of incentives that is positively related to (i) the 
firm’s risk-aversion and (ii) the marginal cost of the effort needed to deliver the outcome 
expected by the funder (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Therefore, it is may be socially optimal 
to offer R&D subsidies aimed at closing the R&D gap, but the intervention may not generate 
the desired outcome if risk-aversion induces the innovative firms to discount the future returns 




Overall, the theory of contracts predicts that information asymmetry between the funder and 
the funded firms is conducive to the extraction of informational rents by high-R&D-
productivity firms; the deviations from first-best outcomes would be exacerbated as the firms’ 
risk aversion increases. A pertinent question here is whether the funder can achieve first-best 
outcomes by monitoring the firms’ observable performance, which is the actual level of R&D 
investment. Demski and Sappington (1984) demonstrate that this is feasible only if the agents’ 
productivities are correlated. If the agents are heterogenous, the high-productivity agent can 
still mimic the low-productivity type and extract informational rents. Furthermore, the 
observed R&D investment is a noisy outcome of the firms’ unobserved R&D productivity. 
Both Laffont and Martimort (2002) and Akcigit et al. (2017) demonstrate that monitoring the 
observed outcomes of unobserved agent productivity or effort does not enable the principal to 
elicit truthful information about the agent’s true type.  
 
We now draw on Schumpeterian models of innovation (Aghion et al., 2014; 2015) to identify 
observable firm types and R&D types that can be mapped onto unobserved R&D productivity 
and risk aversion as factors that moderate the effect of R&D subsidy on business R&D 
investment. In these models, firms survive and grow as they add new product lines; or shrink 
and eventually exit as their product lines become less profitable or obsolete due to creative 
destruction. Stated differently, firm value and age are related positively to the firm’s R&D 
productivity, defined as the success with which the firm converts R&D investments into 
innovative and profitable product lines. Following Aghion et al., (2014), we can state the 








      (1) 
The value of the innovative product line in year t, 𝑣𝑡, is increasing with adjusted profitability 
of the innovative product line (𝜋𝐴𝑡), which is the difference between gross profits (𝜋𝑡) and the 
cost of R&D investment (𝐶𝑡
𝑅𝐷). It is also increasing with R&D intensity (𝑧𝑖𝑡) but decreasing 
with the creative destruction rate (xt) and the discount rate (𝜌𝑡) in the denominator. 
Furthermore, the firm’s market value is a linear function of the number of innovative product 
lines (kt), the latter’s normalised average value (vt) and output per product line (Yt), as indicated 
in (2) below.  
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𝑉𝑡(𝑘) = 𝑘𝑡𝑣𝑡𝑌𝑡       (2) 
In equation (3), the firm chooses the R&D intensity (zit) that maximises the contribution of the 
innovative product line to firm’s market value. Here, Wage_costt is the cost of employing R&D 
scientists and technicians, and 1/ 𝜂 is the elasticity of innovation with respect to employment 














     (3) 
R&D intensity in (3) is increasing with R&D productivity (profitability of  the innovative 
product line); but it is decreasing with the discount rate (𝜌𝑡), the rate of creative destruction 
and wage cost. Finally, the firm’s survival time is a positive function of its R&D productivity, 
as demonstrated in Ugur et al. (2016a). Assuming that the firm’s market value follows a Wiener 
process until liquidation (McDonald and Siegel, 1985), Ugur et al. (2016a) relates survival time 
to R&D productivity as indicated in (4) below, where 𝐸[𝑡] is expected time until exit and 𝑉0 is 
the initial market value of the firm.  
𝐸[𝑡] ≅ 2 
2𝜇−𝜎2
[ln (𝑘𝑡) + ln (
𝑌𝑡
𝑉0
) + 𝑙𝑛 𝜋𝐴𝑡
𝜌𝑡+𝑥𝑡−𝑧𝑖𝑡
 ]   (4) 
Three predictions follow from equations 1 – 4 above. First, firms that are successful in 
converting R&D investment into innovative product lines have larger market values (equation 
2) and survive longer (equation 4). Secondly, the R&D intensity is higher when the firm is 
more successful in converting R&D inputs into innovative and profitable product lines 
(equation 3). Therefore, high-R&D-productivity firms are closer to the R&D frontier and as 
such would have narrower R&D gaps – i.e., the difference between their actual and socially-
optimal levels of R&D investment would be smaller.  
Finally, more risk-averse firms would utilise a higher discount rate, 𝜌𝑡, and invest less in R&D 
at each level of R&D productivity (equation 3). This is in line with neo-classical and 
evolutionary models (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959), where return uncertainty is conducive to 
lower demands for R&D investment under risk aversion. It is also in line with findings from 
the real option theory of investment, where return uncertainty increases the value of the waiting 




Other findings that support the prediction from the Schumpeterian models include Kwon 
(2010), who investigates how firms allocate resources when they compete for multiple patents 
with heterogeneous research projects simultaneously. This work demonstrates that the firms’ 
resource allocation is biased away from risky and basic research, even when spillovers do not 
exist; and the market may fall short of supplying major innovations despite large R&D 
expenditures and strong patent protection. Similar support can be seen in empirical work, which 
report that higher R&D return uncertainty is associated with lower R&D investment when the 
firms are risk averse. (Goel and Ram, 2001; Caggese, 2012; Ghiglino and Tabasso, 2016).  
In what follows, we consider the three predictions above in reverse order and develop three 
hypotheses that we aim to test in this study. Starting with the role of risk aversion, we 
hypothesize that an increase in R&D return uncertainty induces the firm to utilise a higher 
discount rate and leads to lower business R&D investment that, in turn, leads to a wider R&D 
gap. To induce the firm to close the R&D gap, the funder must offer a higher subsidy rate that 
includes a risk premium. This is indeed what we observe in the UK funding criteria that fund 
basic research up to 100% of the project cost (Table 1) and in the subsidy allocations that cover 
a higher proportion of the eligible firms during crisis periods (Table 2).  
Although higher subsidy rates are required to satisfy the participation constraint of the risk-
averse firms, the latter’s R&D investment are less responsive to subsidy when R&D returns 
are uncertain (Aristei et al., 2017; Czarnitzki and Toole, 2013; Bloom, 2007). This is also what 
is implied by equation (3) above: the subsidy reduces the cost of R&D, increases the adjusted 
profits, and induces the firm to increase its privately optimal R&D intensity; but the subsidy’s 
effect on the firm’s R&D intensity would be small or insignificant if the firm discounts the 
future R&D returns at higher rates.  
This is in line with empirical findings indicating that the responses of both subsidised and 
unsubsidised firms to financial crises are pro-cyclical (Fabrizio and Tsolmon, 2014). It is also 
in line with findings that both subsidised and unsubsidised firms invest less in basic R&D due 
to higher return uncertainty (Nelson, 1959; Czarnitzki and Toole, 2013). Finally, the insight 
from the Schumpeterian models is also consistent with theoretical findings on increasing 
returns to ‘waiting’. In this line of work,  firms prefer to defer sunk-cost investments when 
return uncertainty is high and there are positive returns to waiting (Bernanke, 1983; Bloom et 




H1: Compared to non-crisis periods or to R&D types with higher market readiness 
levels, R&D subsidies are less effective in generating additionality effects during 
financial crises and when the investment is in basic R&D.  
If supported by evidence, H1 implies that the financial constraints faced by innovative firms 
(Czarnitzki and Toole, 2007; Hall, 2002; 2010; Minton and Schrand, 1999) may justify the 
granting of R&D subsidies but the relaxation of the financial constraint through subsidies does 
not necessarily induce business R&D investment. This is because the R&D subsidy addresses 
market failures due to risk aversion, moral hazard and information asymmetry between the 
firms and capital markets; but creates new problems that arise from information asymmetry 
and risk aversion in the relationship between the firms and the public funder.  
 
Insights from the theory of contracts and Schumpeterian models are better placed to explain 
not only why the case for R&D subsidies is stronger when capital/financial market failures are 
severe and, hence, the R&D gaps are wider. They can also explain why subsidies may remain 
ineffective in bridging the R&D gap when risk-averse firms face higher return uncertainty. In 
addition, insights from the theory of contracts imply that the funder may have little power to 
nudge the firms towards the socially optimal level of R&D investment because the subsidy 
contract does not provide for a third-party adjudicator that can “…credibly impose 
punishments” on the party that violates the contract (Laffont and Mortimort, 2009, pp.253,271).   
 
Our second hypothesis (H2) relate to the moderating role of the firm’s proximity to the R&D 
frontier. As indicated above, Schumpeterian models of innovation predict that, ceteris paribus, 
an increase in R&D productivity rises the average value of the innovative product line in (1) 
and this leads to a higher level of R&D intensity, zi, in (3). On the other hand, the theory of 
contracts predicts that the funder must satisfy the participation constraint of the high-R&D-
productivity firms to minimise the distortion of the subsidy allocations in favour low-R&D-
productivity firms. However, information asymmetry enables the high-R&D-productivity 
firms to conceal their types and extract informational rents (Laffont and Mortimort, 2009; 
Akcigit et al., 2017_. Given these insights, we state our second hypothesis (H2) as follows:  
H2: The responsiveness of different types of R&D investment to public subsidies is 
weaker the closer is the firm’s R&D intensity to the R&D frontier in the industry.  
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H2 is consistent with and encompasses diverse findings in the empirical literature on R&D 
subsidies. For example, Lach (2002) observes that funders prefer to fund projects with higher 
success probability, but such preference reduces the scope for additionality effects because 
such projects typically have higher private rates of return and might have been undertaken 
without a subsidy. Similarly, Wanzenböck et al., (2013) report that R&D-intensive firms are 
less likely to exhibit behavioural additionality because such firms have the capacity and the 
experience to undertake desired R&D projects irrespective of public support. Finally, Lee 
(2011) reports that crowding-out effects among large firms are due to their proximity to the 
technology frontier, which leaves little need for catching up.  
 
Our third hypothesis (H3) is based on mapping the unobserved R&D productivity and R&D 
gap on to firm age, size, and market share. In equation (1), the higher is the R&D productivity, 
the larger is the value of the innovative product line (v) that, in turn, determines firm size 
through aggregation of product lines. Firms with higher R&D productivity have a larger 
number of profitable product lines (larger size) and larger market values. These firms, in turn, 
would survive longer in accordance with (4). Therefore, high-R&D-productivity firms are 
larger, older, and would have larger market shares. Furthermore, such firms would have 
narrower R&D gaps compared to low-R&D-productivity firms. Because of narrower R&D 
gaps, larger and older firms, and those with larger market shares, would be less responsive to 
R&D subsidy compared to other firms with opposite characteristics. Hence, we state H3 as 
follows:  
 
H3: The responsiveness of larger and older firms, and those with larger market shares, 
to R&D subsidies is weaker across all R&D types.  
The analysis above and the derived hypotheses offer a systematic approach to explaining why 
effect-size estimates vary between and within studies (Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). In what 
follows, we first discuss our empirical strategy. Then we provide evidence on how the effect 
of the subsidy on business R&D investment varies by R&D and firm types by the phases of the 




4.   Data and empirical strategy 
  
4.1 Data 
Our data is from the Business Research and Development Database (BERD) and Business 
Structure Database (BSD).5 The BERD survey is based on a sample of R&D-active firms 
stratified by product group and employment size-bands. The stratified sample consists of large 
firms (size-band1) with 400+ employees (sampled 1:1); size-band2-firms (100-399 employees) 
sampled 1:5 and size-band3-firms (1-99 employees) sampled at a rate of 1:20. In 2012, 400 
large R&D-spenders, that are included in the survey every year, account for 78% of UK 
business R&D expenditures (ONS, 2012, p.14).  The survey questionnaire asks reporting units 
to state intramural (in-house) and extramural (contracted-out) R&D expenditures. For 
intramural R&D, the firm is also asked to provide a breakdown by current and capital R&D 
expenditure. In turn, the current R&D expenditure is broken down as basic research (“work 
undertaken for the advancement of scientific knowledge without a specific practical application 
in view”), applied research (“research undertaken with a general or particular application in 
view”) and experimental research (“results of the basic and applied research directed to the 
introduction of new materials, processes, products, devices and systems …”)6. Finally, the 
questionnaire asks the firm to state the amount of the intramural R&D financed privately, from 
UK public funds and from EU funding.7  
In the dataset, the firm’s subsidy (treatment) status in each year is determined by whether the 
firm receives UK funding in that year. Moreover, the UK funding disbursed in any year is 
conditional on R&D expenditures incurred in the implementation of funded R&D project(s) 
during the year. Therefore, the level of R&D investment by the firm in any year includes both 
the subsidy received and the expenditures financed privately. As such, the dataset allows for 
identifying the treatment’s (subsidy’s) effect on various components of the firm’s R&D 
investment in each year - provided that the treated and untreated samples are comparable with 
respect to all relevant characteristics apart from the treatment status.  
We merge the BERD with the Business Structure Database (BSD), which is the universe of all 
UK firms registered for value-added tax (VAT) and on the pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) system. 
 
5  Office for National Statistics (2019a; 2019b).  See also Ugur et al. (2016b). 
6 See examples of the questionnaires at https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/business/ 
7 The privately funded R&D investment we use in this paper is the difference between total intramural R&D 
expenditures and the sum of UK and EU subsidies.  
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The BSD contains information on firm turnover, employment, age, survival status, etc. 
Combining information from both datasets, we obtain a sample of 43,650 firms observed from 
1998 to 2012. Table 2 presents annual information about R&D intensity (R&D a percentage of 
turnover), subsidy rates (UK subsidies as a percentage of privately-funded R&D), and coverage 
ratios (percentage of firms subsidised) for each year. Column 1 indicates that privately funded 
R&D intensity has fallen in the final year of the dot.com crisis in 2002 and from 2009 onwards 
during the global financial crisis. This is in line with patterns reported in the relevant theoretical 
and empirical literature (Acemoglu and Linn, 2005; Dubois et al., 2015; and Aghion et al., 
2012). In contrast, the subsidy rate (column 2) and the coverage rate (column 3) have increased 
from the second year of the crisis periods and remained higher than average for at least two 
years thereafter. 
 
Table 2: Private R&D expenditures and UK subsidies by year. 
 1. Private R&D intensity  2. Subsidy intensity 3. Coverage 
Year 
(Private R&D expenditures 
as % of turnover) 
(Subsidy as % of 
private R&D 
expenditures) 
(Subsidised firm/years as 
% of total firm/years) 
1998 2.7 10 86 
1999 2.9 10 86 
2000 2.8 9 77 
2001 2.9 7 94 
2002 2.5 4 94 
2003 3.4 12 97 
2004 2.9 11 95 
2005 2.9 8 90 
2006 2.4 7 92 
2007 2.3 6 89 
2008 2.8 6 84 
2009 2.2 7 97 
2010 2.2 7 95 
2011 2.5 8 96 
2012 2.3 7 97 
Average 2.6 8 92 
Note: Pooled sample of 43,650 firms with 154,980 firm/year observations over 1998-2012. Excludes 
firm/year observations with private R&D intensity greater than 1. 
 
 
The evidence in Table 2 suggests that the funder has increased the level of support after the 
crisis events, perhaps with a view to encourage R&D investment when the firm’s perceived 
risks are higher and the financing constraint is more biting due to the downturn in the business 
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cycle. These funding decisions may be justified from a social-welfare perspective but, under 
H1, we expect their additionality effects to be smaller than the effects in the full sample. 
 
Table 3: Private R&D expenditures and UK subsidies by age and size deciles. 
(Pooled panel of 43,650 firms with 154,980 firm/year observations) 




Subsidy Subsidy rate Coverage 
Panel A - By age deciles  (£ bn.) 
(Private R&D as 
% of turnover) 
(£ bn.) 
(Subsidy as % of 
private R&D) 
(Subsidized firm-
years as % of 
total firm-years) 
1st  decile: age ≤ 3 years 1.27 4.2 0.14 11 96 
2nd  decile: 3 < age ≤ 6 yrs.  3.25 3.8 0.14 4 94 
3rd  decile: 6 < age ≤ 9  yrs. 6.57 3.4 0.77 12 93 
4th  decile: 9 < age ≤ 11  yrs. 8.46 4.6 0.54 6 93 
5th  decile: 11 < age ≤ 14  yrs. 14.50 4.1 0.57 4 93 
6th  decile: 14 < age ≤ 17 yrs. 15.20 3.3 0.95 6 92 
7th  decile: 17 < age ≤ 22 yrs. 29.10 3.3 2.26 8 92 
8th  decile: 22 < age ≤ 26 yrs. 26.00 2.3 2.85 11 90 
9th  decile: 26 < age ≤ 31 yrs. 31.20 2.4 3.03 10 91 
10th  decile: age > 31 years 59.40 2.0 3.43 6 90 
Share of top 50% 82.5%  85.3%   
Share of top 30% 59.8%  63.4%   
Share of top 10% 30.47%  23.37%   
 
Panel B - By size deciles 
     
1st  decile: 1 employee 0.23 1.5 0.03 14 96 
2nd  decile: 2 employees 0.25 6.1 0.03 12 97 
3rd  decile: 3 or 4 employees 0.31 3.6 0.04 12 96 
4th  decile: 4<employees ≤ 9  0.70 2.8 0.07 10 95 
5th  decile: 9<employees≤ 15  0.95 1.7 0.06 7 94 
6th  decile: 15<employees≤ 25  1.52 2.9 0.09 6 94 
7th  decile: 25<employees≤ 43  2.49 2.3 0.13 5 93 
8th  decile: 43<employees≤ 83  4.93 2.0 0.22 4 92 
9th  decile: 83<employees≤ 205  11.20 2.4 0.34 3 91 
10th decile: >205 employees 172.00 2.6 13.70 8 80 
Share of top 50% 98.7%  98.4%   
Share of top 30% 96.7%  96.9%   
Share of top 10% 88.23%  93.32%   




Table 3 provides further descriptive information by age and size (employment) deciles. The 
percentage of the subsidy allocated to firms in the top 50% of the distribution is proportionately 
higher, at 85.3% and 98.4%, respectively. The skew in favour of old and large firms is even 
19 
 
more evident in the top decile of the distribution, where 30% of the subsidy is allocated to 
oldest and 88% is allocated to largest firms. If the evidence lends support to our third hypothesis 
(H3), these patterns suggest that the subsidy allocations tend to favour firms that are less likely 
to create additionality. 
Key characteristics of the subsidized and non-subsidized samples are summarised in Table 4.8  
 







 Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. 
1.  Public subsidy (£1,000) 0 0 79.09 3000.25 73.02 2882.97 
2.  Privately funded R&D (£1,000) 6065.9 45717.4 545.90 15372.05 969.28 19509.76 
3.  Private R&D intensity  .058 .146 .089 .150 .087 .150 
4.  Total R&D intensity .058 .147 .101 .178 .098 .176 
5.  UK subsidy funding rate 0 0 .009 .042 .009 .040 
6.  R&D personnel employed 34.765 151.847 5.559 83.896 7.835 91.254 
7.  R&D personnel intensity 0.080 .236 .095 .194 .094 .198 
8.  Firm age (years) 19.244 10.263 17.087 10.386 17.253 10.392 
9.  Deflated turnover (£1,000) 153105 1081527 28371.2 425118.5 37938.2 507617.7 
10. Firm employment  70.952 8.125 20.863 5.680 22.897 6.025 
11. Start-up dummy .133 .339 .256 .436 .247 .431 
12. Young firm dummy (< 7 years old) .154 .361 .213 .409 .208 .406 
13. Mature firm dummy (> 14 years old) .624 .484 .537 .498 .544 .498 
14. Old firm dummy (> 24 years old) .353 .478 .264 .441 .271 .444 
15. Small firm dummy (<=25 employees) .338 .473 .565 .496 .547 .498 
16. SMEs (50 to 250 employees) .259 .438 .225 .418 .228 419 
17. Large firm dummy (> 250 employees) .283 .450 .085 .279 .101 .301 
18. Survivor firm dummy for the whole time .707 .455 .744 .435 .742 .437 
19. Extramural R&D intensity .006 0.034 .006 .021 .006 .022 
20. Capital R&D expenditures intensity .004 0.015 .005 .011 .005 .011 
21. R&D tax credit dummy, SMEs 2008+ .145 .352 .393 .488 .372 .483 
22. R&D tax credit dummy, large firms 2008+ .048 .215 .011 .106 .014 .117 
23. R&D tax credit dummy, SMEs 2000+ .587 0.492 .850 .357 .829 0.376 
24. R&D tax credit dummy, large firms 2002+ .225 0.418 .066 .249 .079 0.270 
25. Interaction dummy: SMEs subsidy*R&D tax  .266 .442 .795 .403 .746 .435 
Observations 10282  133563  143845  
Notes: + indicates that the R&D tax credit policy changes started from that year. Minimum and maximum 
values are excluded to comply with non-disclosure requirements of the data owners. Excludes firm/year 
observations with private R&D intensity greater than 1. The number of firm-year observations may differ from 
those reported in other tables due to sample-specific one-year-lagged covariates.  
 
Compared to non-subsidised counterparts, subsidized firms spend less on R&D (row 2) and 
employ less R&D personnel (row 6). The subsidized firms are also smaller than the non-
subsidized firms in terms of turnover (row 9) and total employment (row 10). Nevertheless, in 
 
8 The sample excludes firm-year observation with private R&D intensity greater than 1. The number of excluded 
firms is 738 with 2,190 firm-year observations. The excluded firms have excessively high levels of private R&D 
intensity (up to several hundreds) due to very small turnover values. Most of these firms have short survival times 
and exit during the analysis period (see Ugur et al., 2016a).  
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terms of the R&D input intensity, subsidized firms have a relatively higher R&D intensity 
(rows 3 and 4) and higher R&D personnel intensity (row 7) compared to non-subsidized firms.  
 
The proportion of start-ups (row 11) and young firms (row 12) in the subsidized sample is 
higher than their proportion in the non-subsidized sample. In contrast, the proportion of mature 
firms (row 13) and old firms (row 14) is higher in the non-subsidized sample. However, the 
difference between the proportions of old and mature firms in the subsidized and non-
subsidized samples is smaller than the comparable difference for start-ups and young firms. 
We observe a similar pattern with respect to SMEs (row 16). Finally, surviving firms have 
similar proportions in both subsidized and non-subsidized samples.  
 
4.2 Empirical strategy 
Our aim is to estimate the effect of public funding on various types of business R&D inputs, 
including privately funded R&D, applied R&D, experimental R&D, basic R&D, extramural 
R&D, R&D capital expenditures, and employment of R&D personnel. To achieve this aim, we 
start by addressing the issue of alignment between the policy intervention and the R&D 
investment outcomes.  
 
In the data, the firm is treated if it receives R&D subsidy for any project type, which can be a 
basic, development, experimental or capital R&D project. As such, the data does not allow for 
pairing a specific subsidy (e.g., a subsidy for a basic R&D project) with a specific R&D type 
(e.g., basic R&D expenditure). This is a common data constraint problem that affects most of 
the literature on the effects of the subsidy as a direct support instrument and all of the literature 
that investigates the effectiveness R&D tax credits as a direct support instruments. The problem 
is addressed by assuming (often implicitly) that different types of R&D expenditures (e.g., 
basic, development, experimental, or capital R&D) are complements. Under this assumption, 
a subsidy received or R&D tax credits claimed for a particular R&D project (e.g., a basic R&D 
project) affect the firm’s R&D expenditure on basic R&D as well as other R&D expenditures 
that may be necessary either to implement the basic R&D project or exploit the new knowledge 
from basic research. A similar complementarity is assumed when the firm receives subsidies 
for multiple R&D projects, the subsidisation of which affects R&D spending on those projects 
and the remaining projects that may be necessary for successful implementation of the 




Nevertheless, there is no theoretical consensus on whether R&D types are complementary or 
substitutes. In a seminal paper on the relationship between R&D capital and productivity, 
Griliches (1979) indicates that privately-funded and publicly-funded R&D capital can be either 
substitutes or complements; and recommends that the issue can be resolved only empirically. 
The findings that follow tend to indicate complementarity. For example, Mantovani (2006) 
demonstrates that, under monopolistic competition, process and product innovations are 
complementary and firms always prefer the simultaneous adoption of both innovation types. 
Using data on large R&D investors, Lokshin et al., (2008) find that extra-mural and intra-mural 
R&D have complementary effects on productivity, with the implication that firms that increase 
investment in intra-mural R&D are expected to invest more in extra-mural R&D.  More 
recently, Mohnen et al. (2018) report that investments in ICT, R&D and organizational 
innovation are complementary, with investment in one innovation type increasing the 
probability of investing in others as joint investments lead to higher TFP growth than individual 
investments.  
 
Given these findings, we assume complementarity between different R&D types, with the 
implication that the effect of a subsidy for any or all types of R&D projects in any year will 
affect the individual and aggregate measures of busines R&D investment in the year or 
thereafter in the same direction. Hence, we provide effect-size estimates for the effect of the 
treatment on both aggregate business R&D measures such as privately funded R&D or 
employment of R&D personnel; and individual R&D types such as basic research, capital 
R&D, development R&D, and extra-mural R&D etc. The former type of treatment effect 
estimation is the most common exercise in the literature. The latter is reported less frequently, 
but has been used to estimate the effects of a composite intervention on basic and development 
research investment separately (e.g., Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008; Czarnitzki et al., 2011).  
 
Our effect-size estimator is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) - the conditional 
difference in mean outcomes for treated (subsidized) and untreated (non-subsidized) firms in 
the sample. We use two outcome measures: (i) the logarithm of the R&D input’s ratio to 
turnover and the share of scientists and technicians in total employment; and (ii) the annual 
growth rate of the R&D input and R&D personnel intensities – i.e., the first difference of the 
intensity measures in (i). Our preferred measure is the latter as first-differencing eliminates the 
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firm-specific fixed effects. However, we conduct sensitivity checks with the logarithm of the 
R&D input and R&D personnel intensities.  
 
The ATT estimator compares a firm’s R&D input intensity when it receives the subsidy with 
the same firm’s unobserved counterfactual outcome in the absence of the subsidy. Given that 
the firm cannot be observed in both states at the same time, it is necessary to construct a 
counterfactual by selecting control (untreated) firms that are as close as possible to the treated 
firms with respect to a range of pre-treatment characteristics (covariates) that affect both 
selection into treatment and the treatment outcome (Heckman et al., 1998; Smith and Todd, 
2005).  
 
The expected value of the sample average of the treatment effect on the treated (SATT) can be 
stated as follows:  
 
𝐸[𝑆𝐴𝑇𝑇] = E[𝐘𝒊𝒕(1)|  𝐗𝒊𝒕−𝟏,𝐷𝑖𝑡=1] – E[𝐘𝒊𝒕(0)|  𝐗𝒊𝒕−𝟏,𝐷𝑖𝑡=1]   (6) 
 
Here, i and t index firm and year; E is the expectation operator; 𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the binary indicator that 
is 1 if a firm receives R&D subsidy and 0 otherwise;  𝐘𝒊𝒕 is the outcome variable as defined 
above, with  𝐘𝒊𝒕(1) indicating the outcome for the treated firm and  𝐘𝒊𝒕(0) indicating the 
outcome for untreated firm. We use one-year-lagged covariates ( 𝐗𝒊𝒕−𝟏) covariates that may 
affect selection into treatment and the measured outcome. The use of lagged covariates reduces 
the risk of simultaneity in the covariate balancing model.  
 
The conditional expectation E[𝐘𝒊𝒕(1)|  𝐗𝒊𝒕−𝟏,𝐷𝑖𝑡=1] can be estimated directly from the observed 
sample of treated firms, but the conditional expectation E[𝐘𝒊𝒕(0)|  𝐗𝒊𝒕−𝟏,𝐷𝑖𝑡=1] is the 
unobserved counterfactual. With randomised control trial (RCT) data, the counterfactual 
E[𝐘𝒊𝒕(0)|  𝐗𝒊𝒕−𝟏,𝐷𝑖𝑡=1] can be consistently estimated from a randomly selected control group. 
However, this option is not available for observational studies such as our work. The solution 
is to estimate E[𝐘𝒊𝒕 (0)|  𝐗𝒊𝒕−𝟏,𝐷𝑖𝑡=1] using a control group of units that are equivalent to the 
treated units (firms) with respect to a wide range of pre-treatment characteristics.  
 
A variety of pre-processing methods exist for estimating the counterfactual outcome with 
observational data. One approach is to ensure comparability between the treated and untreated 
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samples through inverse probability weights. The other relies of propensity score weights that 
are used to obtain covariate balance between the treated and control groups. Both approaches 
estimate the ATT consistently if the propensity scores are estimated correctly to ensure that the 
control-group outcome is orthogonal to (independent of) the treatment status (Rosenbeim and 
Rubin, 1983). If this independence condition is satisfied, the counterfactual outcome can be 
estimated as follows: 
 








        (7) 
 
Here, the correct propensity weights (𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑝
) are equal to 
𝑝𝑖𝑡
1−𝑝𝑖𝑡
, where 𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the correctly estimated 
propensity score. The weights will ensure the that the control group is balanced with treated 
group if the propensity scores are correct (Hirano et al., 2001; 2003).  
 
However, propensity-score balancing methods face several challenges. First, the true 
propensity scores are unknown, and their estimates are model-dependent. Incorrect model 
specification leads to biased propensity-score and treatment-effect estimates. Secondly, it may 
be difficult to balance all pre-treatment covariates jointly – either because the selection into 
treatment is complex or the data is highly multidimensional. Such difficulties induce a process 
of cyclical and often ad hoc iterations that involve selecting a propensity score model and then 
checking some standardized difference for each covariate between treated and control groups. 
Imai et al., (2008) criticise such iterations as “propensity score tautology” with questionable 
statistical assumptions (King and Nielson, 2019). Cyclical iterations between matching or 
weighting, propensity score modeling, and balance checking often results in low overall 
balance (Hainmueller, 2012). Finally, propensity score methods ensure covariate balance only 
asymptotically even when the propensity score model is specified correctly. Remaining 
imbalances in finite samples require a different weighting scheme that allows for imposing 
restrictions not only on the first moment of the distributions, but also on higher moments such 
as variance and skewness (Hainmueller, 2012; Hainmueller and Xu, 2013). 
 
To overcome these limitations, Hainmueller (2012) proposes to estimate the counterfactual 
outcome with entropy balance (EB) weights, web. The EB weights are chosen through a 
weighting scheme that minimises an entropy distance metric, which decreases with the base 
weight (𝑞𝑖 = 1/n0). The base weight is the reciprocal of the number of units (n0) in the control 
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group. The EB weights thus obtained can be used to obtain the population average treatment 
effect on the treated (PATT) in accordance with (8).  
 







     (8) 
 
The EB weights, web, are chosen by minimizing the entropy distance H(w) in (6), where the 
base weights for the firms in the control group is 𝑞𝑖, subject to balance conditions for the 
sample moments of the control group.  
min H(W) = ∑𝑤𝑖log(𝑤𝑖/𝑞𝑖)       (9) 
 𝑤𝑖 
 
The sample moments of the control group of firms are reweighted with coefficients 𝐶𝑟so that 
it is equal to the sample moments, mr, of the treated group of firms in accordance with (10).  
 
∑𝑤𝑖𝐶
𝑟 = 𝑚𝑟          (10) 
 
The sample moment conditions can be one (mean), two (mean and variance) or three (mean, 
variance, and skewness). The weighting is subject to a normalization constraint that the sum 
of all non-negative weights is equal to one, as indicated in (11). 
  
∑𝑤𝑖 =1 and 𝑤𝑖>0         (11) 
 
Notice that (6) minimizes a measure of dissimilarity between probability distributions of the 
control and treated group of firms. As such, it provides a well-known measure of informational 
gain from approximating one probability distribution to another. The minimization of the 
divergence between the probability distributions of the treated and control group is a general 
principal of statistical inference (Kullback, 1959). We use the EB method implemented in Stata 
by Hainmueller and Xu (2013), which allows for covariate balancing up to three moments 
(R=3): mean, variance and skewness.  
 
We obtain EB weights for a total of 139 covariates, including: 19 pre-treatment covariates at 
the firm level; 7 covariates at the industry level; 8 indicator variables that capture the receipt 
of EU subsidies and the change in the UK’s R&D tax regime; 2 crisis dummies for 2000-2002 
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and for 2008-2010; 15 year dummies; 4 Pavitt technological class dummies, and 84 industry 
dummies at the two-digit SIC level. Description and measurement of the covariates are in Table 
A1 in the on-line Appendix.  
 
We estimate the ATT with weighted least squares (WLS), using EB weights as analytical 
weights. We account for sources of heterogeneity in two ways. Our preferred method is to 
estimate ATTs based on different samples that correspond to different R&D and firm types, 
and crisis periods. These include: (i) two crisis periods during 2000-2002 and 2008-2010; (ii) 
different R&D input types, including private RD, R&D personnel employment, basic R&D, 
applied R&D, experimental R&D, capital R&D investment, and extramural R&D; (iii) 
quartiles of the distributions for firm age, size, market-share, and proximity to R&D frontier; 
and (iv) firms in the manufacturing sector only and those that survive throughout the entire 
period. We also probe the robustness of the split-sample outcomes with regression analysis, 
where the treatment effects estimated form the full sample are regressed on firm type, R&D 
type and crisis period variables in line with Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013). Congruence 
between the findings from both methods can be interpreted as an indicator of robustness. 
 
In the case of privately funded R&D, the ATT indicates additionality if it is positive and 
significant, or crowding-out in case of negative and significant value. This is because private 
R&D expenditures are fully funded by the firm from its own resources or through credit or 
equity market. An insignificant ATT estimate indicates no effect. In the case of other R&D 
inputs such as basic R&D, experimental R&D, or employment of R&D personnel, a positive 
ATT estimate indicates either additionality or absence of full crowding-out; whereas an 
insignificant or negative ATT indicates crowding-out effect. This is because the private and 
public sources of funding for these R&D expenditures are not separated.  
 
Zhao and Percival (2017) demonstrate that the EB method: (i) is consistent with the doubly-
robust estimator of the treatment effect; (ii) reaches the asymptotic semiparametric variance 
bound of the doubly-robust estimator when both the selection and outcome models in the latter 
are correctly specified; (iii) produces smaller bias than conventional doubly robust estimators; 
and (iv) estimates the treatment effect with the smallest variance when applied to data used in 
four major studies in the research field. Apart from these qualities, the EB method has the 
advantage of making full use of the information in the control sample - in contrast to most 
matching methods that omit non-matching control units. In addition, Amusa et al. (2019) find 
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in numerical simulations that the EB tends to outperform propensity-score-based matching 
estimators. As such, EB constitutes a welcome addition to the range of treatment-effect 
estimators that rely on direct covariate balancing instead of matching (Athey and Imbens, 
2017). Finally, the method has been applied in over 40 evaluation studies (examples of which 
include McMullin and Schonberger, 2020; Marcus, 2013; and Neuenkirch and Neumeier, 
2016) published in 11 business and economics journals.  
 
Against these advantages, the EB weighting method has two potential limitations 
(Hainmueller, 2012).9 The first arises from data quality. If the treatment and control groups are 
very different in size or the selection to treatment is multidimensional, the method does not 
provide EB weights that satisfy all moment conditions (mean, variance and skewness 
equivalence). The solution is either to reduce the moment conditions or obtain more data. 
Secondly, the EB weights for some control units may require a high level of adjustment because 
there may be only few ‘good’ control units similar to treated units. In such cases the control 
units may receive large weights, which increase the variance of the treatment-effect estimate.10  
 
In this study, we have encountered the first issue and addressed it by restricting the moment 
conditions to the mean and variance, excluding skewness.  Although higher moment conditions 
imply better covariate balance, the EB weights obtained even with one moment condition (the 
mean) provide better sample balancing than propensity-score weights. This is because the EB 
method corrects for any residual imbalances in the sample, whereas the propensity score 
methods ensure covariate balancing only asymptotically (Hainmueller, 2012; Hainmueller and 
Xu, 2013; and Zhao and Percival, 2017). Nevertheless, we take account of this limitation by 
augmenting the outcome model with the covariates in the weighting model to: (i) control for 
the effect of any remaining imbalance; and (ii) obtain more efficient ATT estimates.  Our 
findings indicate that the augmented model does yield smaller standard errors, but the 
magnitude of the ATT estimate is not affected by inclusion of the balancing covariates.   
 
To address the second issue, we conduct sensitivity checks to verify if large weights for some 
control units lead to biased treatment-effect estimates. One check consists of using base 
 
9 Hainmueller (2012) points out a third limitation, which is encountered when the method does not provide a 
weighting solution because of inconsistency in balance constraints, which we did not encounter.  




weights obtained from a coarsened exact matching (CEM) routine (Iacus et al., 2011; Blackwell 
et al., 2009) instead of the uniform base weights (1/n0) that are the default in the estimator. The 
other consists of trimming the top 1% of the EB weights and re-estimating the treatment effect 
with the trimmed sample. In all samples, we have found that less than 4% of the control group 
units are reweighted in the trimmed sample, which suggests that trimming may not be necessary 
(see Huber et al., 2010). Nevertheless, we have estimated ATTs trimming the top percentile of 
the weights and found little or no change in the estimated parameters. This was the case with 
or without alternative base weights. Following Hainmueller and Xu (2013), we have also 
checked if the variance of weights is converging to about the same minimum for a given 
sample, when initial weights are changed or the top percentile of the weights are omitted. The 
convergence is observed in all estimation samples we evaluate in this paper.  
 
The checks above notwithstanding, we are aware that the use of pooled panel data may pose 
some challenges for treatment-effect estimations. First, firms may be in receipt of subsidy for 
several times over the analysis period. Therefore, it may be difficult to disentangle the effect 
of subsidy in a particular year from the effect of subsidies in previous years. We address this 
issue by including a past (one-year-lagged) subsidy indicator in the covariate balancing model. 
This ensures that the subsidy status of the firms in the year that precedes the outcome is 
balanced between the control and treatment groups in each sample. We also estimated the ATT 
by regressing the outcomes in years t+1 and t+2 on the treatment (subsidy) indicator for year t. 
The results indicate that the subsidy in year t has very small or insignificant effects on the 
outcomes in year t+1 and t+2. This is as expected because the firm receives public funding in 
any year only for R&D expenditures incurred in that year.11  
 
Secondly, UK firms also receive European Union (EU) grants; and they are entitled to R&D 
tax credits (indirect support) in addition to R&D subsidies (direct support). We address these 
issues by including binary variables that take the value of 1 if: (i) the firm is a recipient of 
subsidy from UK and EU sources; (ii) the year corresponds to the implementation of the tax-
credit regime as applied to SMEs in 2001; (iii) the year corresponds to the change in its 
implementation to include large firms in 2003; (iv) separate dummies for the R&D tax credit 
policy adjustments for SMEs and large firms in 2008. Inclusion of these covariates ensure that, 
 
11 See the discussion on the funding regime above. 
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in each sample, the treated and control units are balanced in terms of their exposure to the R&D 
tax credit policy.  
 
Finally, we have also addressed the issue of potential time-series dependence in pooled panel 
data, which is usually ignored in most empirical work in the field. Overlooking the potential 
for time-series dependence may lead to misleading inference due to incorrect standard errors. 
We address this issue through bootstrapping, which resamples all time periods for each firm in 
the pooled data as recommended by Wooldridge (2010).     
 
5.  Results 
The summary statistics for pre-treatment covariates in the EB weighting model are presented 
in Table A1 in the on-line Appendix. They include 19 covariates at the firm level; 7 covariates 
at the industry level, including Pavitt technology classes; 6 dummy variables that capture the 
receipt of EU subsidies and the change in the UK’s R&D tax regime; and 2 crisis dummies for 
2000-2002 and for 2008-2010. The EB weighting model is estimated with 15 year-dummies 
and 84 SIC 2-digit industry dummies, but these are not reported in the table to save space. All 
firm-and industry-level covariates are lagged one year so that treated and untreated firms are 
balanced one year before the payment of the subsidy and the implementation of the subsidised 
project(s) in year t.  
 
Information on balancing quality is reported in the on-line Appendix for a selection of samples, 
including the full sample, the sample for the global financial crisis period (2008-2010), firms 
in the first quartile of the employment distribution, firms in third quartile of the age distribution, 
and firms in the fourth quartile of the market-share distribution.12 As a general rule, we sought 
covariate balance for two moments (mean and variance) and evaluated the quality of the 
covariate balance using the standardised difference between means of treated and reweighted 
control groups.  
 
We are aware of the ongoing debate on the metrics for evaluating covariate balance quality. 
Two most used measures are the standardized difference (bias) in means and t-tests for 
differences in means (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Imai, King, and Stuart (2008) criticize the 
 
12 Descriptive statistics and entropy balancing information for other samples used in the estimations are not 
reported here to save space, but are available on request. 
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use of t-tests and argue for QQ plot summary statistics. A recent simulation study (Franklin et 
al., 2013) indicates that several metrics are appropriate, including the standardized difference 
in means. The latter also has the advantage that it automatically evaluates balance on all 
covariates simultaneously and can incorporate balance on interactions among covariates. 
Furthermore, simulation results in Hainmueller (2012) indicate that EB weighting yields 
standardised differences very close to zero and p-values of almost 1, when t-tests are conducted 
for mean differences. Therefore, we rely on standardised difference as the metric for evaluating 
covariate balance.  
 
The standardised difference between means of the subsidised and unsubsidised firms are 
reported in column 10 (before EB weighting) and column 11 (after EB weighting) of each table 
in the online Appendix. Not surprisingly, the standardised mean differences are large before 
EB weighting. Hence, effect size estimates without weighting or matching would be evidently 
biased. In contrast, the standardised differences after EB weighting are negligible and any 
difference from zero is usually observed only after the third decimal point. A comparison of 
the covariate variances between subsidised and non-subsidised firms after EB weighting also 
indicates that the variances are usually equal up to three decimal points.13  
 
Table 5 reports ATT estimates for different R&D input types over the full estimation period 
1998-2012 (column 1) and during two subperiods that correspond to the dot.com crisis and 
global financial crisis (columns 2 and 3). The first finding to note is that the ATT is positive 
and  statistically and practically significant (around 2% to 5%) for privately funded R&D, R&D 
personnel intensity, development R&D and experimental R&D. However, the ATTs for basic 
R&D, capital R&D and extra-mural R&D are much smaller: they are practically insignificant 
albeit statistically significant. The ATT for privately funded R&D indicates additionality, 
whereas the rest indicate absence of full crowding out. The second point to note is that the 
ATTs are always smaller or insignificant during crisis periods (columns 2 and 3).  
 
These findings in Table 5 provide empirical support for H1, which stipulates that R&D 
subsidies are less effective in generating additionality effects during financial crises or when 
the investment is in basic research. Comparing the rows, we observe that the subsidy’s effect 
 
13 Because of the high dimensionality of the selection process (hence, the EB) with 139 covariates described in 
Table A2 in the Appendix, we were unable to obtain covariate balance in terms of skewness.  
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on basic R&D (row 3) is smaller than the effect on all other R&D types, except extra-mural 
and capital R&D in rows 6 and 7. Comparing columns, we see that the ATTs during crisis 




Table 5. UK R&D subsidy and R&D investment during crisis periods:  
ATTs for different R&D types. 
Subsidy effects on growth of: 
(1) Full sample 
(2) dot-com crisis 
2000-2002 
(3) Global financial 
crisis 2008-2010 










































 Observations in control sample N0 = 10282 N0 = 1821 N0 = 3510 
 Observations in treated sample N1 = 133563 N1 = 15955 N1 = 38934 
Note: The outcome variable is the growth of R&D input intensity. Bootstrap standard errors are estimated with 
100 iterations. N0 is number of firm-year observations in the control (unsubsidised) sample; N1 is number of firm-
year observations in the treated (subsidised) sample. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
 
The smaller subsidy effects on basic R&D or during crisis periods are due to higher return 
uncertainty, which reduces the risk-averse firm’s optimal level of R&D investment. Returns to 
basic research are more uncertain because the its immediate commercial applications are less 
clear and even successful basic research outcomes are converted into profitable product lines 
with long time lags.15 R&D return uncertainty is also higher during crisis periods because of 
 
14 We found similar results when the outcome measure is the logarithm of the R&D input intensities instead of 
growth rates. These are not reported here to save space but are available on request. Furthermore, we find that the 
subsidy’s effect on private R&D intensity is smaller when we regress the effect-size estimate on two crisis 
dummies (see Table A6 in the on-line Appendix). 
15 The ONS survey defines basic research as “work undertaken primarily for the advancement of scientific 
knowledge without a specific practical application in view”. This definition is based on the Frascati Manual, 
accessible at https://www.oecd.org/sti/frascati-manual-2015-9789264239012-en.htm 
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higher product-market uncertainties, which increase the volatility of the returns on all types of 
R&D investment. Therefore, the responsiveness of risk-averse firms to the subsidy is weaker 
if the investment is basic R&D or undertaken during crisis periods.  Our findings are in line 
with: (i) empirical findings in Aristei et al., (2017) who report weaker additionality effects 
during the global financial crisis; (ii) predictions from investment models of R&D under 
uncertainty (Czarnitzki and Toole, 2013); and (iii) predictions from ‘waiting’ models where 
R&D investment is persistent and less responsive to policy interventions due to higher return 
uncertainty (Bloom, 2007).  
 
Results in Table 5 also lends support (or is congruent with) the assumption of complementarity 
between different R&D types. Although the specific R&D type targeted by the subsidy is not 
known, the effect of the subsidy on aggregate and individual measures of R&D investment is 
in the same direction. This is particularly important in the case of extra-mural (contracted-out) 
R&D that, by definition, is not eligible for R&D subsides. Although the ATTs for extra-mural 
R&D are small, they indicate that firms that increase intra-mural R&D investment in response 
to the subsidy also tend to increase their contracted-out R&D investment. This finding 
resonates with Lokshin et al., (2008), who report complementarity between the productivity 
effects of intramural and extra-mural R&D investment.  
 
In Table 6 we provide evidence on how the subsidy’s effects on basic R&D vary by firm type 
in terms of their locations in the age, size and market share distributions. The results indicate 
that the small and positive subsidy effects on the growth of basic R&D intensity decline and 
eventually become insignificant among older and larger firms and firms with larger market 
shares. This finding indicates that the subsidy’s effect is heterogeneous not only between R&D 
types but also between different firm cohorts even in the case of basic research. The overall 
effect reported in Table 5 above for the full sample is mainly due to the response of basic R&D 
investment in smaller and younger firms, which receive a small fraction (around 8-10 percent) 
of the subsidy allocations. 
 
Results in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that the ‘financing constraint’ argument is necessary but not 
sufficient to explain the subsidy’s effect on business R&D investment in general or basic R&D 
investment in particular. It is true that financial constraints are more biting when the investment 
is in basic research due to higher levels of information asymmetry between the firm and private 
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funders; or during recessions due to pro-cyclical behaviour of the capital markets. That is why 
several studies (e.g., Czarnitzki and Toole, 2007; Hall, 1992; 2002; 2010; Minton and Schrand, 
1999) recommend direct or indirect public support for basic R&D and R&D investment during 
crisis periods. This is also reflected in the R&D support policies in the UK and elsewhere, 
which are more generous in the case of basic research or during crisis periods. Our proposed 
analytical framework, however, can and does explain the results through risk aversion. R&D 
subsidies do alleviate the financing constraint in the case of basic research or during crisis 
periods, but this positive effect is mitigated by the adverse effects of higher rates with which 
firms discount the future returns on riskier projects.  
 
Table 6: Effects of UK R&D subsidy on basic R&D by firm-type quartiles: 
ATTs for growth of basic R&D intensity. 
 Basic R&D 
by age quartile 
Basic R&D 
by size quartile 































































Notes: The sample size for different R&D types differs because firms do undertake all types of R&D investment 
every year. N1 and N0 are numbers of treated and control observations. For other notes, see Table 6 and 7. 
 
Combining the findings in Tables 5 and 6 with descriptive evidence in Tables 1 – 4, we can see 
that the effect of the subsidy on business R&D investment tends to be smaller or insignificant 
when the subsidy rate is higher. Noting that funders subsidise up to 100% of the project cost 
for basic research and the subsidy intensity or coverage rates are higher during crisis periods, 
we identify the first conundrum in public support for business R&D as follows: it is socially 
optimal to allocate higher levels of subsidy for basic research or during economic downturns, 




Table 7 presents the results for the subsidy’s effects on the growth of different R&D input 
intensities, depending on the firms’ distance to the R&D frontier in the 3-digit industry. The 
results indicate clearly that the ATTs are insignificant in the first and second quartiles of the 
distance to the R&D frontier, where firms are closer to the frontier defined as the 95th percentile 
of the relevant R&D input intensity in the industry and year. The effect-size becomes 
significant but remains small in quartile 3; and it is relatively larger in quartile 4, where firms 
are the furthest away from the R&D frontier. This is the case irrespective of the R&D input. 
These findings are in line with H2, which assumes that the subsidy’s effect on various types of 
business R&D investment is smaller the closer is the firm to the R&D frontier in the industry. 
This is because firms the optimal level of R&D intensity among firms closer to the R&D 
frontier would be higher and their R&D gaps would be smaller even in the absence of the 
subsidy, as indicated in equation (2). Therefore, the subsidy would induce smaller and 
eventually insignificant additional R&D investment as the firms move closer to the R&D 
frontier.  
 
Table 7. Effects of UK R&D subsidy by R&D type and firm proximity to R&D frontier: 








































































































Notes: Distance to R&D frontier is measured as the difference between the 95th percentile of the total R&D 
intensity in the 3-digit SIC industry (254 industries) and the firm’s own R&D intensity. The number of subsidised 
and control firm-year observations varies between quartiles as firms are not sampled every year in the ONS survey. 
Each quarter has the same number of non-missing common observations. N1 and N0 are the numbers of treated 
and control observations respectively. 
 
In the data (Table 4), the subsidised firms have higher levels of R&D intensity compared to 
unsubsidised sample. As such, the subsidised sample includes a higher proportion of firms 
closer to the R&D frontier. Thus, the combination of the descriptive evidence and ATT 
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estimations reveal a second conundrum in public support for business R&D: it is socially 
optimal to support high-R&D-productivity firms closer to the R&D frontier as they are more 
likely to be successful in converting R&D inputs into successful innovations, but firms closer 
to the R&D frontier are less likely to generate additionality effects as their R&D gaps are 
narrower. Our proposed theoretical framework explains this conundrum through insights form 
the theory of contracts (Laffont and Mortimort, 2009; Akcigit et al., 2019), where high-R&D-
productivity firms have lower R&D gaps, but are more likely to extract informational rents by 
concealing their true types. It also provides a unified theoretical underpinning for similar 
findings reported in Lach (2002), Lee (2011), and Wanzenböck et al., (2013). 
The estimated parameters in panel A (Table 8) indicate that the ATTs are declining with age, 
size and market share for two aggregate measures R&D inputs: privately funded R&D intensity 
and R&D personnel intensity. A similar pattern is evident in panel B, where we report ATTs 
for two specific measures: extramural R&D and capital R&D investment. In both panels, the 
ATTs are the largest among youngest and smallest firms and for companies in the most 
competitive markets (quartile 1). Then the ATTs decline and become insignificant as firms 
grow in age or size or capture larger market shares. The pattern clearly indicates the positive 
effect of the subsidy on these R&D inputs in the full sample (Table 5) conceals a high degree 
of heterogeneity as the full-sample effect is driven by the impact among smaller/younger firms. 
As such, the sample average ATT is a poor basis for evidence-based public policy. 
 
Results in Table 8 lend support to H3, which postulates that the subsidy’s effect on business 
R&D investment is negatively related to firm age, size, and market share. This is because the 
age, size and market share of the firm are determined by the efficiency with which it converts 
the R&D investment into innovative product lines. Stated differently, firms with higher R&D 
productivity are older and larger in accordance with Schumpeterian models of innovation 
(Aghion et al., 2014; 2015). Also, firms with higher R&D productivity are those with narrower 
R&D gaps and with lower levels of responsiveness to R&D subsidies as suggested by the 
theory of contracts (Laffont and Mortimort, 2009; Akcigit et al., 2019). Finally, the findings in 
Table 8 are consistent with Lach (2002), Gonzalez and Pazo (2008), and Wanzenböck et al., 
(2013), who report that the additionality effect is observed mainly among small firms. They 
are also in line with the review of Zúñiga-Vicente et al., (2014), who conclude that the subsidy 






Table 8: Effects of UK R&D subsidy by age, size and market share quartiles. 
Panel A: ATTs for privately funded R&D and R&D personnel intensity. 
Growth of private R&D intensity by firm Growth of R&D personnel intensity by firm 














































































































Panel B: ATTs for extramural R&D and capital R&D intensities. 
Growth of extramural R&D intensity Growth of capital R&D expenditures intensity 












































































































Notes: Age is measured in years; employment is number of employees, turnover is deflated with GDP deflator, 
market share is estimated at 3-digit SIC industry level (254 industries). N1 and N0 are numbers of treated and 
control observations. For other notes, see Table 6 and 7.  
 
The results in Table 8 point out to a third conundrum in public support for business R&D: 
Funders tend to allocate subsidies to larger and older firms with proven track records, but 
such firms are less likely to produce additionality effects. This is particularly the case in the 
UK, where disproportionately higher percentages of the subsidy are allocated to older and 
36 
 
larger firms.  
 
Our final remark relates to the robustness of the findings discussed above to a wide range of 
sensitivity checks, reported in the on-line Appendix. In Table A2, we checked whether the 
findings differ when the logarithm of R&D intensity is used as the outcome variable instead of 
the growth in R&D input intensity. In Table A3, we restricted the sample to surviving firms 
only to verify if the exclusion of exiting firms leads different findings. Then we restricted the 
sample to manufacturing firms only (Table A4) and used initial weights from a coarsened exact 
matching (CEM) procedure. Finally, we regressed the estimated ATTs for private R&D 
intensity growth in the full sample on firm characteristics and crisis periods. The results from 
all sensitivity checks are consistent with the results reported and discussed above. Therefore, 
we are confident that our main findings are not driven by sample selection or initial weights 
used by the entropy balancing routine.  
 
6. Conclusions  
In this paper, we have evaluated the effects of R&D subsidies on separate and aggregate 
measures business R&D investment theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we have 
drawn on the theory of contracts and Schumpeterian models of innovation to derive testable 
hypotheses on why the subsidy’s effect on business R&D may vary by R&D type and firm 
characteristics. The proposed theoretical framework allows for identifying the sources of 
heterogeneity in a systematic manner, which we achieve by: (i) unpacking the subsidy contract 
to demonstrate how unobserved R&D productivity, R&D gap and risk aversion moderate the 
effect of the subsidy on business R&D investment; and (ii) mapping the unobserved moderating 
factors on to observable factors related to firm characteristics (age, size, market share, distance 
to R&D frontier) and R&D types (basic, applied, experimental, capital R&D etc.).  
 
Our second contribution consists of enhancing the evidence base with findings that are 
consistent with the proposed hypotheses and remain robust to a wide range of sensitivity 
checks. The evidence indicates that the effects of R&D subsidies: (i) are positive in the full 
sample, but they conceal a high degree of heterogeneity; (ii) are smaller or insignificant when 
investment is in basic research or during crisis periods; and (iii) decline and eventually become 
insignificant as firms are older, larger and closer to the R&D frontier.  Our work strengthens 
the case for paying attention to heterogeneity in the subsidy’s effects on business R&D and 




Our third contribution is to place the policy conundrums in public support for business R&D 
under the spotlights. Specifically, we have demonstrated that the subsidy regime would deliver 
sub-optimal subsidy allocations and second-best firm R&D effort due to information 
asymmetry and risk aversion. Under information asymmetry, subsidy allocations and the firm’s 
R&D effort remain suboptimal due a trade-off between the funder’s attempts at ensuring 
efficiency by satisfying the participation constraints of the high-R&D-productivity firms and 
the latter’s ability to extract informational rents by concealing their true types. These second-
best outcomes are exacerbated when firms are more risk averse. The main policy-relevant take-
away from our findings can be stated as follows: it is socially optimal to subsidise business 
R&D when the R&D gap is wider or the subsidised firms are more likely to convert R&D 
inputs into innovative product lines, but the subsidy would be less effective under these 
circumstances. This is due to risk aversion in the former and informational rent extraction in 
the latter case.  
 
Our work also expands the range of treatment-effect estimators used to evaluate the subsidy’s 
effect on business R&D investment. The entropy balancing (EB) method allows for better 
covariate balancing for a larger number of covariates; has been shown to perform better than 
propensity-score matching routines; is comparable with the doubly-robust estimator when both 
the selection and outcome models in the latter are correctly specified; and produces smaller 
bias than conventional doubly robust estimators. Furthermore, the EB method has the 
advantage of making full use of the information in the control sample.  
  
Our findings suggest that R&D subsidies may be necessary but not sufficient for maximising 
social welfare and closing the R&D gap, defined as the difference between actual and socially 
optimal levels of R&D investment. To bridge the R&D gap, direct support for R&D should 
target small and young firms where it is more likely to generate additionality effects. To 
maximise social welfare despite the efficiency shortfall from targeting small and young firms, 
the policy can rely on ex post ‘innovation prizes’ that reward successful innovations by all 
innovators. Nevertheless, ex post innovation rewards require further research on measuring and 
verifying innovation quality; and more transparent innovation systems in which private 
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Information asymmetry, risk aversion and R&D subsidies: 
Effect-size heterogeneity and policy conundrums 
ONLINE APPENDIX. 
 
This on-line appendix provides summary statistics, sensitivity checks and entropy balancing quality 
diagnostics for the paper above. The tables here are referred to in the main paper.  
  
Table A1. Summary statistics for one-year-lagged covariates in the entropy balance (EB) weighting model. 
 Control group (N0 = 10282) Treated group (N1 = 133563) 
 Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Log employment 4.427 2.113 3.112 1.729 
UK ownership dummy  0.759 0.428 0.870 0.336 
R&D intensity 0.071 0.155 0.089 0.147 
Log age 2.757 0.724 2.597 0.795 
Live local units (plants) 10.970 136.007 2.917 57.540 
Log deflated turnover 8.965 2.700 7.301 2.343 
Log deflated turnover per employee 4.617 1.171 4.350 0.952 
Share of R&D personnel in empoyment 0.081 0.157 0.088 0.116 
Def. turnover growth 0.076 0.622 0.052 0.551 
Market share  0.026 0.086 0.006 0.036 
UK subsidy dummy 0.418 0.493 0.967 0.178 
UK and EU sub. dummy 0.280 0.449 0.787 0.410 
Civil R&D only dummy 0.753 0.431 0.424 0.494 
Tax credit for small firms 0.505 0.500 0.819 0.385 
Tax credit for large firms 0.215 0.411 0.064 0.245 
Start-up firm dummy 0.044 0.205 0.071 0.258 
Young firm dummy 0.150 0.357 0.204 0.403 
SME dummy 0.502 0.500 0.535 0.499 
Private R&D intensity 0.070 0.154 0.079 0.130 
Basic R&D intensity 0.005 0.037 0.009 0.027 
Experimental R&D intensity 0.027 0.083 0.030 0.053 
Extramural R&D expenditure intensity 0.006 0.032 0.005  0.019 
Capital R&D expenditure intensity 0.003     0.012 0.005 0.009 
Indicator for SMEs R&D tax credit change 
in 2008 
0.003     0.012 0.414     0.493 
Indicator for large firm R&D tax credit 
change in 2008 
0.158    0.364 0.013 0.111 
Indicator that SMEs cannot use R&D 
subsidies for tax deduction 
0.055     0.228 0.824 0.381 
Applied R&D intensity 0.027 0.085 0.038 0.075 
Herfindahl index  0.123 0.138 0.094 0.103 
Crisis dummy 2008-2010 0.308 0.462 0.280 0.449 
Dot.com crisis dummy 2000-2002 0.166 0.372 0.116 0.320 
Pavitt class1 dummy 0.162 0.368 0.322 0.467 
Pavitt class2 dummy 0.096 0.295 0.229 0.420 
Pavitt class3 dummy 0.156 0.363 0.106 0.308 
Pavitt class4 dummy 0.461 0.499 0.293 0.455 
Notes: The EB weighting model consists of 133 covariates, 17 pre-treatment covariates at the firm level; 7 covariates 
at the industry level; 6 dummy variables that capture the receipt of EU subsidies and the change in the UK’s R&D tax 
credit regime; 2 crisis dummies for 2000-2002 and for 2008-2010; 15 year dummies; and 84 industry dummies at the 
two-digit SIC level. Year and industry dummies are not reported here to save space. All variables except crisis dummies 
and R&D tax regime dummies are lagged one year. Market share and the Herfindahl index are calculated within 3-digit 
industries. The full sample excludes firm/year observations with privately funded R&D intensity greater than 1. 
Minimum and maximum values are not reported to comply with non-disclosure requirements of the data host, UK Data 




Table A2. Sensitivity check 1- ATTs using logarithm of private R&D intensity: 
By age, size and market share quartiles.  
 By age quartiles By employment 
quartiles 
By deflated turnover 
quartiles 
By market share 
quartiles 





N = 36,022 
.1055*** 
(.0211) 
N = 36,022 
0.1181*** 
(0.0229) 
N = 36,022 
Quartile 2 .0368** 
(.0145) 
N = 36,073 
.0265*** 
(.00837) 
N = 36,073 
.0324*** 
(.0083) 
N = 36,073 
0.0225** 
(0.0096) 
N = 36,073 
Quartile 3 .0159 
(.0163) 
N = 36,073 
.0139 
(.0098) 
N = 35,570 
.0106 
(.0077) 
N = 35,570 
0.0051 
(0.0049) 
N = 35,570 
Quartile 4 .0009 
(.0007) 
N = 34,109 
-.0131 
(.0143) 
N = 34,109 
-.0114 
(.0097) 
N = 34,109 
-0.0053 
(0.0055) 
N = 34,109 
Notes: The outcome variable is the logarithm of R&D input intensity. Bootstrap standard errors are estimated with 
100 iterations.  N is number of firm-year observations in the quartile. The number of firm-year observations varies 
between quartiles as firms are not sampled every year in the ONS survey. Market share is the firm’s share in 






































Quartile 1  
N0= 749 


































































  Note: N0 - number of control observations, N1 - number of treated observations.  
 
































Quartile 1  
N0= 813 


































































  Note: N0 - number of control observations, N1 - number of treated observations.  
 
Table A4. Sensitivity check: ATTs for manufacturing firms, using two-year-lagged covariates, or R&D intensity 
cut-off point at 99th percentile instead of 96th percentile. 
 Manufacturing 
firms only  
All EB covariates 
lagged two years 
R&D intensity cut-off 
point at 99 percentile 










































Number of control observations N0 
Number of treated observations N1 
N0= 5038 
N1 = 94784 
N0= 7189 
N1 = 101381 
N0 = 7195 



































Quartile 1  
N0= 35765 


































































  Note: N0 - number of control observations, N1 - number of treated observations.  
 
 
Table A6. Regression-based indicators of effect-size heterogeneity 
Dependent variable Effect-size estimate  
based on growth of  
private R&D intensity 
Effect-size estimate 
based on logarithm of 
private R&D intensity 
Private R&D  0.0005*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Private R&D squared -0.0094*** -0.0094*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Logarithm of firm age -0.0016*** -0.0016*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Logarithm of firm employment -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Interaction of logarithm of firm age* 





Market share at 3-digit industry -0.0151*** -0.0150*** 
SIC level (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Distance to the R&D frontier 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.00004) (0.00004) 
Logarithm of firm turnover -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.00004) (0.00004) 
Logarithm of number of plants -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.00006) (0.00006) 
dotcom -0.0010*** -0.0010*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
crisis2008_2010 -0.0011*** -0.0010*** 
 (0.00007) (0.00007) 
_cons -0.0001 0.0681*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
N-observations 123152 123152 
AIC -751227.0 -751676.3 
BIC -751110.4 -751559.6 
F-statistic 543.9 543.9 
Note: The estimated treatment effect is regressed on firm characteristics and indicator variables for crisis periods. 
Heteroscedasticity and first order autocorrelation robust errors are in parentheses.  





Table A7. Entropy weighting balance for the entire sample in estimation of the growth effects of private R&D intensity. 




st sdiff_Pre sdiff_Post 
Llogage 2.6587 2.8179 2.6588 0.5171 0.4329 0.5171 -0.8720 -1.0738 -0.9802 -0.2214 -0.0001 
Llog_empl 3.1526 4.5059 3.1529 2.9029 4.2553 2.9040 0.4349 0.1909 0.5212 -0.7943 -0.0002 
Luk_ownership 0.8697 0.7598 0.8697 0.1133 0.1825 0.1134 -2.1963 -1.2162 -2.1961 0.3265 0.0000 
Lrd_int 0.0857 0.0706 0.0857 0.0210 0.0243 0.0210 3.0735 3.4375 3.3714 0.1044 0.0000 
Lpri_rd_int 0.0768 0.0688 0.0768 0.0164 0.0232 0.0164 3.1403 3.4662 3.4598 0.0631 0.0000 
Llive_lu 2.9742 11.1875 2.9763 3453.0116 18648.4516 3458.5298 84.7473 26.2460 79.3199 -0.1398 0.0000 
Llogrturn 7.3712 9.0568 7.3717 5.3348 6.9857 5.3362 0.0474 0.0544 0.0597 -0.7298 -0.0002 
Llogrprod 4.3725 4.6205 4.3727 0.9009 1.3776 0.9009 0.3437 -0.0608 0.1517 -0.2612 -0.0001 
LRD_pers 6.0639 45.3304 6.0678 8453.6328 30356.3409 8453.3452 46.1794 9.0374 30.2408 -0.4271 0.0000 
Lgrowth 0.0517 0.0764 0.0517 0.3038 0.3866 0.3038 1.2971 2.0933 0.8197 -0.0447 0.0000 
Lshare 0.0064 0.0262 0.0064 0.0013 0.0074 0.0013 14.6850 6.6440 16.0548 -0.5433 -0.0001 
LUK_sub 0.9674 0.4178 0.9674 0.0315 0.2433 0.0315 -5.2671 0.3333 -5.2670 3.0967 0.0000 
Ldouble_ukeu 0.7787 0.2927 0.7787 0.1723 0.2071 0.1723 -1.3428 0.9110 -1.3430 1.1707 -0.0001 
Lcivil_dummy 0.4278 0.7623 0.4278 0.2448 0.1812 0.2448 0.2920 -1.2323 0.2919 -0.6762 -0.0001 
Lsmesrd 0.8493 0.5432 0.8492 0.1280 0.2482 0.1280 -1.9525 -0.1736 -1.9520 0.8554 0.0001 
Llargerd 0.0670 0.2326 0.0671 0.0625 0.1785 0.0626 3.4632 1.2658 3.4617 -0.6623 -0.0002 
Lstart 0.0508 0.0288 0.0508 0.0482 0.0279 0.0482 4.0899 5.6388 4.0901 0.1005 0.0000 
Lyoung 0.1809 0.1250 0.1809 0.1482 0.1094 0.1482 1.6581 2.2683 1.6583 0.1453 0.0000 
Lsmes 0.7126 0.5699 0.7125 0.2048 0.2451 0.2049 -0.9393 -0.2823 -0.9391 0.3152 0.0001 
LExtramur_RD_int 0.0054 0.0063 0.0054 0.0004 0.0010 0.0004 15.1907 9.6290 18.6757 -0.0473 0.0000 
Lcapexprndint 0.0050 0.0035 0.0050 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 5.1663 8.9567 4.8095 0.1518 0.0000 
Lsmesrd08 0.4134 0.1596 0.4134 0.2425 0.1341 0.2425 0.3518 1.8590 0.3519 0.5154 0.0000 
Llargerd08 0.0125 0.0546 0.0125 0.0123 0.0517 0.0124 8.7769 3.9190 8.7698 -0.3794 -0.0002 
Lsubsidysmes 0.8239 0.2897 0.8239 0.1451 0.2058 0.1451 -1.7009 0.9274 -1.7006 1.4027 0.0001 
distance 0.0953 0.1238 0.0944 0.0109 0.0195 0.0108 3.1484 2.2940 3.2158 -0.2738 0.0081 
herfindahl_index 0.0942 0.1230 0.0942 0.0108 0.0193 0.0108 3.1975 2.5043 3.1882 -0.2774 0.0000 
crisis2008_2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
dotcom 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 
pavittd1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 
pavittd2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 
pavittd3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 
pavittd4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
49 
 
2000.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 5 0 0 
2001.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 5 0 0 
2003.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 0 0 
2004.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 4 0 0 
2005.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 0 
2006.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 0 0 
2007.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 
2008.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 0 0 
2009.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 3 0 0 
2011.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 0 0 
2.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 72 45 0 0 
5.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 106 42 106 0 0 
6.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 68 15 68 0 0 
8.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 15 26 0 0 
9.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 22 31 0 0 
10.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 5 0 0 
11.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 24 19 0 0 
12.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 102 21 102 0 0 
13.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 7 9 0 0 
14.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 11 16 0 0 
15.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 20 21 0 0 
16.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 10 15 0 0 
17.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 8 12 0 0 
18.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 6 11 0 0 
19.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 11 43 0 0 
20.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 5 0 0 
21.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 8 15 0 0 
22.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 6 0 0 
23.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 12 8 0 0 
24.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 6 15 0 0 
25.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 4 0 0 
26.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 3 0 0 
27.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 11 6 0 0 
28.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 4 0 0 
29.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 7 0 0 
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30.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 7 13 0 0 
31.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 5 10 0 0 
32.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 6 0 0 
33.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 7 9 0 0 
35.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 17 49 0 0 
36.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 18 50 0 0 
37.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 22 49 0 0 
38.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 15 31 0 0 
41.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 31 13 0 0 
42.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 32 18 0 0 
43.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 18 9 0 0 
45.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 28 11 0 0 
46.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 0 0 
47.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 11 6 0 0 
49.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 4 34 -1 0 
50.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 110 12 110 -1 0 
51.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 122 24 122 0 0 
52.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 4 28 -1 0 
53.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 11 54 0 0 
55.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 42 16 0 0 
56.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 27 13 0 0 
58.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 7 0 0 
59.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 13 11 0 0 
61.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 13 16 0 0 
62.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 0 0 
63.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 20 18 0 0 
64.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 25 21 0 0 
65.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 31 27 0 0 
66.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 21 10 0 0 
68.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 17 11 0 0 
69.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 24 11 0 0 
70.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 16 6 0 0 
71.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 4 0 0 
72.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 0 0 
73.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 24 11 0 0 
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74.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 36 12 0 0 
75.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 38 42 38 0 0 
77.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 34 12 0 0 
78.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 20 13 0 0 
79.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 6 18 0 0 
81.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 59 16 0 0 
82.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 16 7 0 0 
84.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 366 46 366 0 0 
85.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 5 16 -1 0 
86.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 14 18 0 0 
87.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 25 31 0 0 
88.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 14 30 0 0 
90.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 15 15 0 0 
91.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 14 35 0 0 
92.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 59 34 59 0 0 
93.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 13 23 0 0 
94.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 11 35 0 0 
95.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 27 21 0 0 
96.sic07_2d 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 10 11 0 0 
1.Lcivil_dummy#c.Lrd_int 0.0249 0.0629 0.0249 0.0072 0.0228 0.0072 6.2998 3.6120 7.0344 -0.4497 0.0000 
1.Lyoung#c.Lrd_int 0.0279 0.0101 0.0279 0.0102 0.0043 0.0102 5.2063 9.6035 5.3884 0.1756 0.0000 
1.Lsmes#c.Lrd_int 0.0484 0.0386 0.0484 0.0119 0.0164 0.0119 4.3930 4.7433 4.8778 0.0904 0.0000 
1.Lcivil_dummy#c.Lpri_rd_int 0.0228 0.0617 0.0228 0.0059 0.0221 0.0059 6.3436 3.6310 6.9623 -0.5086 0.0000 
1.Lyoung#c.Lpri_rd_int 0.0244 0.0095 0.0244 0.0079 0.0038 0.0079 5.3442 9.9210 5.7208 0.1682 0.0000 
1.Lsmes#c.Lpri_rd_int 0.0440 0.0376 0.0440 0.0093 0.0158 0.0093 4.3628 4.7907 4.7373 0.0668 0.0000 
1.Lcivil_dummy#c.LRD_pers 3.0453 43.3404 3.0489 3733.5010 29279.9351 3733.4975 68.5748 9.1740 50.7426 -0.6595 -0.0001 
1.Lyoung#c.LRD_pers 0.2520 0.9973 0.2521 22.0997 125.1289 22.1041 247.7113 18.2221 79.0989 -0.1585 0.0000 
1.Lsmes#c.LRD_pers 1.8768 6.1555 1.8769 28.6453 640.1904 28.6743 15.6480 6.7102 17.6625 -0.7994 0.0000 
Notes: Number of treated N1 = 133563 observations, and number of control observations N0 = 10282. Industry and year dummies are excluded to save space. Mean_Tr: mean value of the covariate for treated 
firms; Mean_Pre: mean value of the covariate in the control group before balancing; Mean_Post: mean value of the covariate in the control group after balancing; Var_Tr: variance of the covariate for treated 
group; Var_Pre: variance of the covariate for the control group before balancing; Var_Post: variance of the covariate for the control group after balancing; Skew_Tr: skewness of the covariate for the treated 
group; Skew_Pre: skewness of the covariate for the control group before balancing; Skew_Post: skewness of the covariate for the control group after balancing; SD_diff_Pre: standardized difference between 
treated and control group of firms before entropy balancing; SD_diff_Post: standardized difference after entropy balancing. The standardized difference in means between the treatment and control group is given 
by (𝑠1̅ − 𝑠0̅)/√1/2(𝜎𝑠1
2 + (𝜎𝑠0
2 ), where 𝑠1̅ and 𝑠0̅ are covariate means in the treated and control groups; and 𝜎𝑠1
2  and 𝜎𝑠0
2  are corresponding covariate variances. For other notes, see Table A1.  
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Table A8. Entropy balance of the third quarter of the firms’ employment distribution in estimation of the growth effects of private R&D intensity (industry dummies are 
omitted to save space).  
covariates mean_Tr mean_Co_Pre mean_Co_Post var_Tr var_Co_Pre var_Co_Post skew_Tr skew_Co_Pre skew_Co_Post sdiff_Pre sdiff_Post 
Llogage 2.9119 2.9079 2.9121 0.3015 0.3369 0.3015 -1.0321 -1.1196 -1.1671 0.0073 -0.0003 
Llog_empl 3.7879 3.8326 3.7881 0.1785 0.1739 0.1785 0.0749 -0.0189 -0.0497 -0.1059 -0.0006 
Luk_ownership_dummy 0.8561 0.8490 0.8561 0.1232 0.1282 0.1232 -2.0288 -1.9499 -2.0294 0.0200 -0.0002 
Lrd_int 0.0505 0.0361 0.0505 0.0078 0.0103 0.0078 4.7952 5.4015 2.9855 0.1633 -0.0001 
Lpri_rd_int 1.3555 1.3503 1.3555 1.2831 0.9157 1.2832 6.8648 4.2791 5.2473 0.0046 -0.0001 
Llive_lu 8.3039 8.3566 8.3045 0.8257 0.8966 0.8258 0.5168 0.4104 0.3769 -0.0579 -0.0006 
Llogrturn 4.5412 4.5479 4.5415 0.6658 0.6911 0.6659 0.6675 0.6403 0.3100 -0.0082 -0.0004 
Llogrprod 2.7989 2.5881 2.7993 12.7003 48.0609 12.7083 3.5471 5.5007 4.1885 0.0592 -0.0001 
LRD_pers 0.0457 0.0658 0.0457 0.1817 0.2336 0.1817 1.5803 2.4123 0.0147 -0.0473 0.0000 
Lgrowth 0.0034 0.0051 0.0034 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004 25.9244 23.1681 34.4906 -0.0880 0.0000 
Lshare 0.9658 0.6201 0.9659 0.0330 0.2357 0.0330 -5.1294 -0.4950 -5.1303 1.9033 -0.0001 
LUK_sub 0.7622 0.4588 0.7623 0.1812 0.2484 0.1813 -1.2320 0.1653 -1.2324 0.7128 -0.0002 
Ldouble_ukeu 0.4410 0.6961 0.4411 0.2465 0.2116 0.2466 0.2375 -0.8527 0.2374 -0.5137 0.0000 
Lcivil_dummy 0.9466 0.8313 0.9466 0.0505 0.1403 0.0506 -3.9728 -1.7691 -3.9738 0.5129 -0.0001 
Lsmesrd 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 45.5981 44.9889 45.6024 -0.0006 0.0000 
Llargerd 0.0106 0.0133 0.0106 0.0105 0.0131 0.0105 9.5737 8.4904 9.5744 -0.0269 0.0000 
Lstart 0.0704 0.0849 0.0704 0.0655 0.0777 0.0655 3.3572 2.9795 3.3575 -0.0563 0.0000 
Lyoung 0.0032 0.0032 0.0032 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 17.1032 13.6465 16.4893 -0.0008 0.0000 
LExtramur_RD_int 0.0031 0.0017 0.0031 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 6.7348 16.5345 4.1781 0.2250 -0.0001 
Lcapexprndint 0.4691 0.2131 0.4691 0.2491 0.1678 0.2492 0.1240 1.4011 0.1239 0.5129 0.0000 
Lsmesrd08 0.9144 0.5525 0.9145 0.0783 0.2474 0.0783 -2.9629 -0.2113 -2.9637 1.2936 -0.0001 
Lsubsidysmes 0.2705 0.1180 0.2705 0.0629 0.0334 0.0629 0.8886 2.6080 0.8814 0.6079 -0.0001 
distance 0.0913 0.1199 0.0913 0.0108 0.0179 0.0108 3.2147 2.2149 3.4862 -0.2750 -0.0001 
herfindahl_index 0.3126 0.4406 0.3126 0.2149 0.2466 0.2150 0.8084 0.2395 0.8085 -0.2760 0.0000 
crisis2008_2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 
dotcom 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 
pavittd1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 
pavittd2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 
pavittd3 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 -1 0 
pavittd4 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 6 0 0 
2000.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 5 0 0 
2001.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 12 4 0 0 
2003.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 0 
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2004.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 0 0 
2005.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 
2006.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 3 0 0 
2007.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 0 0 
2009.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 0 0 
2011.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 6 5 0 0 
1.Lcivil_dummy#c.Lrd_int 0.0062 0.0042 0.0062 0.0019 0.0013 0.0019 11.5878 14.6160 8.9266 0.0457 0.0000 
1.Lyoung#c.Lrd_int 0.0181 0.0277 0.0181 0.0037 0.0090 0.0037 7.7271 6.0251 5.2788 -0.1585 -0.0001 
1.Lcivil_dummy#c.Lpri_rd_int 0.0058 0.0041 0.0058 0.0016 0.0013 0.0016 11.6997 15.0616 9.1517 0.0419 0.0000 
1.Lyoung#c.Lpri_rd_int 0.0477 0.0349 0.0477 0.0067 0.0098 0.0067 4.7433 5.5215 2.9764 0.1560 -0.0001 
1.Lcivil_dummy#c.LRD_pers 1.0498 2.1547 1.0501 7.9501 47.6062 7.9585 6.3161 5.7088 8.0313 -0.3919 -0.0001 
1.Lyoung#c.LRD_pers 0.2371 0.1908 0.2371 2.2599 2.3991 2.2600 13.2226 20.9552 16.2129 0.0308 0.0000 
Notes: Number of treated and control observations are 33562 and 2381 respectively. Industry and year dummies are excluded to save space. Mean_Tr: mean value of the covariate for treated firms; Mean_Pre: mean 
value of the covariate in the control group before balancing; Mean_Post: mean value of the covariate in the control group after balancing; Var_Tr: variance of the covariate for treated group; Var_Pre: variance of the 
covariate for the control group before balancing; Var_Post: variance of the covariate for the control group after balancing; Skew_Tr: skewness of the covariate for the treated group; Skew_Pre: skewness of the 
covariate for the control group before balancing; Skew_Post: skewness of the covariate for the control group after balancing; SD_diff_Pre: standardized difference between treated and control group of firms before 
entropy balancing; SD_diff_Post: standardized difference after entropy balancing. The standardized difference in means between the treatment and control group is given by (𝑠1̅ − 𝑠0̅)/√1/2(𝜎𝑠1
2 + (𝜎𝑠0
2 ), where 𝑠1̅ and 
𝑠0̅ are covariate means in the treated and control groups; and 𝜎𝑠1
2  and 𝜎𝑠0
2  are corresponding covariate variances. For other notes, see Table A1.  
 
Table A9. Entropy balance for the third quarter of the firms’ deflated turnover distribution in estimation of the growth effects of private R&D intensity (industry dummies are 
omitted to save space).  
covariates mean_Tr mean_Co_Pre mean_Co_Post var_Tr var_Co_Pre var_Co_Post skew_Tr skew_Co_Pre skew_Co_Post sdiff_Pre sdiff_Post 
Llogage 2.9427 2.9127 2.9429 0.2861 0.3002 0.2862 -1.0678 -1.1260 -0.9939 0.0561 -0.0002 
Llog_empl 4.1609 4.3226 4.1611 0.6980 0.6523 0.6980 -0.1680 -0.1873 -0.0916 -0.1935 -0.0002 
Luk_ownership_dummy 0.7991 0.7695 0.7992 0.1605 0.1774 0.1606 -1.4931 -1.2800 -1.4934 0.0739 -0.0001 
Lrd_int 0.0344 0.0676 0.0344 0.0040 0.0265 0.0040 5.9130 3.4406 5.5202 -0.5279 0.0000 
Lpri_rd_int 0.0326 0.0664 0.0326 0.0035 0.0259 0.0035 5.9223 3.4626 5.4499 -0.5707 0.0000 
Llive_lu 1.7408 1.7100 1.7409 8.5906 6.7158 8.5909 31.1402 19.8674 17.5274 0.0105 0.0000 
Llogrturn 8.8788 9.0372 8.8792 0.8723 0.9847 0.8724 0.3464 0.3323 0.7253 -0.1697 -0.0004 
Llogrprod 4.7411 4.7339 4.7413 0.5539 0.5646 0.5540 0.6551 0.8015 0.9058 0.0097 -0.0003 
LRD_pers 3.7659 12.3277 3.7661 49.4940 1001.8238 49.4991 10.1009 4.4402 17.5068 -1.2170 0.0000 
Lgrowth 0.0589 0.0864 0.0589 0.1770 0.2410 0.1770 2.6882 3.3405 2.6598 -0.0655 0.0000 
Lshare 0.0055 0.0075 0.0055 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 21.2166 15.0327 27.0451 -0.0835 0.0000 
LUK_sub 0.9651 0.5640 0.9651 0.0337 0.2460 0.0337 -5.0692 -0.2581 -5.0698 2.1858 0.0000 
Ldouble_ukeu 0.7603 0.4070 0.7604 0.1822 0.2414 0.1823 -1.2197 0.3787 -1.2199 0.8278 -0.0001 
Lcivil_dummy 0.4837 0.7585 0.4837 0.2497 0.1832 0.2498 0.0653 -1.2079 0.0652 -0.5499 0.0000 
Lsmesrd 0.8988 0.7350 0.8988 0.0910 0.1948 0.0910 -2.6444 -1.0648 -2.6449 0.5431 -0.0001 
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Llargerd 0.0381 0.0476 0.0381 0.0367 0.0454 0.0367 4.8235 4.2492 4.8237 -0.0495 0.0000 
Lstart 0.0085 0.0113 0.0085 0.0085 0.0112 0.0085 10.6848 9.2382 10.6853 -0.0303 0.0000 
Lyoung 0.0618 0.0723 0.0618 0.0580 0.0671 0.0580 3.6407 3.3035 3.6408 -0.0436 0.0000 
LExtramur_RD_int 0.0022 0.0050 0.0022 0.0001 0.0009 0.0001 23.5126 10.2385 23.9285 -0.2487 0.0000 
Lcapexprndint 0.0021 0.0028 0.0021 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 9.6762 9.9150 5.2973 -0.1738 -0.0001 
Lsmesrd08 0.4756 0.2456 0.4757 0.2494 0.1853 0.2495 0.0976 1.1822 0.0975 0.4607 0.0000 
Llargerd08 0.8675 0.4586 0.8675 0.1150 0.2484 0.1150 -2.1673 0.1660 -2.1678 1.2056 -0.0001 
Lsubsidysmes 0.2713 0.1408 0.2713 0.0631 0.0387 0.0631 0.9318 2.0875 0.8524 0.5198 0.0000 
distance 0.0917 0.1119 0.0917 0.0105 0.0160 0.0105 3.1936 2.3634 3.6199 -0.1983 0.0000 
herfindahl_index 0.3098 0.4038 0.3098 0.2138 0.2408 0.2139 0.8226 0.3922 0.8226 -0.2032 0.0000 
crisis2008_2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 
dotcom 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 
pavittd1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 
pavittd2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 
pavittd3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
pavittd4 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 2 6 -1 0 
2000.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 5 0 0 
2001.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 4 0 0 
2003.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 0 
2004.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 3 0 0 
2005.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 0 0 
2006.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 0 0 
2007.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 0 0 
2009.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 0 0 
2011.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 0 0 
1.Lcivil_dummy#c.Lrd_int 0.0150 0.0606 0.0151 0.0025 0.0254 0.0025 8.5316 3.6063 9.0966 -0.9065 0.0000 
1.Lyoung#c.Lrd_int 0.0032 0.0052 0.0032 0.0007 0.0026 0.0007 16.4286 13.5736 11.8486 -0.0736 0.0000 
1.Lcivil_dummy#c.Lpri_rd_int 0.0144 0.0597 0.0144 0.0023 0.0249 0.0023 8.6121 3.6247 8.8823 -0.9422 0.0000 
1.Lyoung#c.Lpri_rd_int 0.0030 0.0051 0.0030 0.0007 0.0026 0.0007 16.7264 13.7661 11.9773 -0.0824 0.0000 
1.Lcivil_dummy#c.LRD_pers 1.8081 11.2315 1.8082 36.8520 970.5225 36.8559 12.7770 4.6411 26.7112 -1.5523 0.0000 
1.Lyoung#c.LRD_pers 0.2482 0.6322 0.2482 4.6564 43.9295 4.6576 22.9246 15.0562 24.0826 -0.1780 0.0000 
Notes: Number of treated and control observations are 33649  and N0= 2390 respectively. Industry and year dummies are excluded to save space. Mean_Tr: mean value of the covariate for treated firms; Mean_Pre: 
mean value of the covariate in the control group before balancing; Mean_Post: mean value of the covariate in the control group after balancing; Var_Tr: variance of the covariate for treated group; Var_Pre: variance of 
the covariate for the control group before balancing; Var_Post: variance of the covariate for the control group after balancing; Skew_Tr: skewness of the covariate for the treated group; Skew_Pre: skewness of the 
covariate for the control group before balancing; Skew_Post: skewness of the covariate for the control group after balancing; SD_diff_Pre: standardized difference between treated and control group of firms before 
entropy balancing; SD_diff_Post: standardized difference after entropy balancing. The standardized difference in means between the treatment and control group is given by (𝑠1̅ − 𝑠0̅)/√1/2(𝜎𝑠1
2 + (𝜎𝑠0
2 ), where 𝑠1̅ and 
𝑠0̅ are covariate means in the treated and control groups; and 𝜎𝑠1
2  and 𝜎𝑠0
2  are corresponding covariate variances. For other notes, see Table A1. 
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Table A10. Entropy balance for the fourth quarter of the firms’ market share distribution in estimation of the growth effects  of private R&D intensity (industry dummies are 
omitted to save space).  
covariates mean_Tr 
mean_Co_




st sdiff_Pre sdiff_Post 
Llogage 2.9830 2.9971 2.9831 0.2915 0.2822 0.2915 -1.2019 -1.2609 -1.1982 -0.0260 -0.0002 
Llog_empl 4.9274 5.8180 4.9276 1.9534 2.7985 1.9535 0.2450 -0.0150 0.2811 -0.6372 -0.0002 
Luk_ownership_dummy 0.7145 0.6267 0.7146 0.2040 0.2340 0.2040 -0.9500 -0.5237 -0.9502 0.1946 -0.0001 
Lrd_int 0.0283 0.0730 0.0284 0.0045 0.0227 0.0045 6.9835 3.4634 6.6133 -0.6642 -0.0001 
Lpri_rd_int 0.0258 0.0721 0.0258 0.0035 0.0221 0.0035 7.1696 3.4701 6.4556 -0.7870 -0.0001 
Llive_lu 8.6336 20.4338 8.6372 13246.8217 35899.9787 13254.5278 43.2826 18.8667 34.8862 -0.1025 0.0000 
Llogrturn 9.7360 10.7821 9.7364 2.6902 4.2993 2.6904 0.2483 0.0511 0.1519 -0.6378 -0.0002 
Llogrprod 4.8291 4.9773 4.8293 0.8378 1.2538 0.8378 1.2518 0.3458 0.8905 -0.1619 -0.0002 
LRD_pers 18.4286 82.0478 18.4342 32289.7411 55326.5154 32302.8325 23.6135 6.6356 15.0057 -0.3540 0.0000 
Lgrowth 0.0677 0.1098 0.0677 0.2289 0.3539 0.2289 3.9279 4.6761 4.5892 -0.0879 0.0000 
Lshare 0.0231 0.0498 0.0231 0.0046 0.0131 0.0046 7.6969 4.8089 9.7006 -0.3928 0.0000 
LUK_sub 0.9477 0.3412 0.9477 0.0496 0.2248 0.0496 -4.0202 0.6701 -4.0203 2.7233 0.0000 
Ldouble_ukeu 0.7323 0.2531 0.7323 0.1961 0.1891 0.1961 -1.0491 1.1356 -1.0493 1.0821 -0.0001 
Lcivil_dummy 0.5973 0.8299 0.5973 0.2405 0.1412 0.2406 -0.3968 -1.7560 -0.3970 -0.4742 -0.0001 
Lsmesrd 0.6334 0.3333 0.6334 0.2322 0.2223 0.2322 -0.5537 0.7071 -0.5538 0.6227 0.0000 
Llargerd 0.2354 0.4156 0.2354 0.1800 0.2429 0.1800 1.2474 0.3425 1.2474 -0.4247 0.0000 
Lstart 0.0094 0.0091 0.0094 0.0093 0.0090 0.0093 10.1938 10.3277 10.1941 0.0024 0.0000 
Lyoung 0.0581 0.0545 0.0581 0.0547 0.0516 0.0547 3.7778 3.9237 3.7779 0.0153 0.0000 
Lsmes 0.7254 0.4413 0.7254 0.1992 0.2466 0.1992 -1.0099 0.2365 -1.0101 0.6365 -0.0001 
LExtramur_RD_int 0.0026 0.0087 0.0026 0.0003 0.0015 0.0003 22.2118 7.9446 19.6803 -0.3786 -0.0001 
Lcapexprndint 0.0017 0.0040 0.0017 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 14.6299 8.6990 9.3137 -0.4394 -0.0001 
Lsmesrd08 0.3656 0.1199 0.3656 0.2319 0.1055 0.2320 0.5583 2.3408 0.5583 0.5102 0.0000 
Llargerd08 0.0475 0.1044 0.0475 0.0453 0.0935 0.0453 4.2524 2.5873 4.2524 -0.2672 0.0000 
Lsubsidysmes 0.6017 0.1824 0.6017 0.2397 0.1492 0.2397 -0.4154 1.6449 -0.4155 0.8564 0.0000 
mrkt_share_3d 0.0238 0.0527 0.0238 0.0046 0.0146 0.0046 7.6966 4.6286 9.2873 -0.4254 0.0000 
herfindahl_index 0.1068 0.1294 0.1068 0.0127 0.0204 0.0127 2.9572 2.5824 3.1867 -0.2004 0.0000 
crisis2008_2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
dotcom 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 
pavittd1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 
pavittd2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 
pavittd3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 
pavittd4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2000.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 5 0 0 
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2001.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 0 
2003.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 4 0 0 
2004.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 4 0 0 
2005.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 0 
2006.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 0 0 
2007.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 
2008.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 0 0 
2009.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 0 0 
2011.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 0 0 
1.Lcivil_dummy#c.Lrd_int 0.0148 0.0686 0.0148 0.0027 0.0221 0.0027 9.5565 3.5685 10.6283 -1.0341 -0.0001 
1.Lyoung#c.Lrd_int 0.0033 0.0040 0.0033 0.0010 0.0015 0.0010 17.1006 15.1994 14.7812 -0.0227 0.0000 
1.Lsmes#c.Lrd_int 0.0204 0.0284 0.0204 0.0031 0.0118 0.0031 8.3263 5.6892 7.9586 -0.1457 0.0000 
1.Lcivil_dummy#c.Lpri_rd_int 0.0139 0.0679 0.0139 0.0023 0.0216 0.0023 9.6356 3.5628 10.1075 -1.1303 -0.0001 
1.Lyoung#c.Lpri_rd_int 0.0029 0.0038 0.0029 0.0008 0.0014 0.0008 17.5663 15.6377 15.8901 -0.0326 0.0000 
1.Lsmes#c.Lpri_rd_int 0.0189 0.0279 0.0189 0.0025 0.0115 0.0025 8.3588 5.7200 7.5945 -0.1796 0.0000 
1.Lcivil_dummy#c.LRD_pers 9.6741 78.5413 9.6795 14278.6253 53474.6095 14291.2895 35.1377 6.7318 25.6469 -0.5763 0.0000 
1.Lyoung#c.LRD_pers 0.3780 1.5699 0.3781 79.9229 219.8841 79.9274 138.4234 14.3734 46.1194 -0.1333 0.0000 
1.Lsmes#c.LRD_pers 2.8497 7.4422 2.8499 57.4073 845.1896 57.4696 13.2679 6.0998 15.1341 -0.6061 0.0000 
Notes: Number of treated and control observations are 30396 and 5006  respectively. Industry and year dummies are excluded to save space. Mean_Tr: mean value of the covariate for treated firms; Mean_Pre: mean 
value of the covariate in the control group before balancing; Mean_Post: mean value of the covariate in the control group after balancing; Var_Tr: variance of the covariate for treated group; Var_Pre: variance of the 
covariate for the control group before balancing; Var_Post: variance of the covariate for the control group after balancing; Skew_Tr: skewness of the covariate for the treated group; Skew_Pre: skewness of the 
covariate for the control group before balancing; Skew_Post: skewness of the covariate for the control group after balancing; SD_diff_Pre: standardized difference between treated and control group of firms before 
entropy balancing; SD_diff_Post: standardized difference after entropy balancing. The standardized difference in means between the treatment and control group is given by (𝑠1̅ − 𝑠0̅)/√1/2(𝜎𝑠1
2 + (𝜎𝑠0
2 ), where 𝑠1̅ and 
𝑠0̅ are covariate means in the treated and control groups; and 𝜎𝑠1
2  and 𝜎𝑠0
2  are corresponding covariate variances. For other notes, see Table A1. 
Table A11. Entropy balance for the first quarter of distance to R&D intensity frontier in estimation of the growth effects of private R&D intensity (industry dummies are 
omitted to save space). 
covariates mean_Tr mean_Co_Pre mean_Co_Post var_Tr var_Co_Pre var_Co_Post skew_Tr skew_Co_Pre skew_Co_Post sdiff_Pre sdiff_Post 
Llogage 2.8668 2.9062 2.8668 0.3723 0.3613 0.3724 -1.1068 -1.2144 -0.9547 -0.0646 -0.0001 
Llog_empl 3.7027 3.8486 3.7029 1.2237 0.9798 1.2243 -0.4554 -0.1830 -0.3955 -0.1319 -0.0002 
Luk_ownership 0.8606 0.8411 0.8606 0.1200 0.1337 0.1200 -2.0816 -1.8663 -2.0818 0.0561 0.0000 
Lrd_int 0.0406 0.0389 0.0407 0.0108 0.0153 0.0109 5.4991 5.1682 5.1354 0.0171 -0.0004 
Lpri_rd_int 0.0378 0.0380 0.0378 0.0091 0.0149 0.0092 5.5060 5.2233 5.3098 -0.0018 -0.0004 
Llive_lu 1.5489 1.5884 1.5490 5.1089 7.7647 5.1138 17.9752 19.7471 7.7937 -0.0175 -0.0001 
Llogrturn 8.0502 8.3788 8.0507 2.8061 2.3115 2.8072 -0.6772 0.1190 -0.6663 -0.1962 -0.0003 
Llogrprod 4.4041 4.5690 4.4044 0.8905 0.8920 0.8906 0.0504 0.8342 -0.1817 -0.1747 -0.0003 
LRD_pers 1.7415 6.3076 1.7441 25.9177 601.1121 26.0527 25.4581 7.0233 15.1790 -0.8969 -0.0005 
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Lgrowth 0.0297 0.0598 0.0297 0.2179 0.2505 0.2179 0.5194 2.9018 -1.6035 -0.0644 0.0000 
Lshare 0.0073 0.0090 0.0073 0.0012 0.0014 0.0012 16.3841 12.0098 17.2011 -0.0516 0.0000 
LUK_sub 0.9426 0.6219 0.9426 0.0541 0.2352 0.0541 -3.8069 -0.5026 -3.8059 1.3794 0.0001 
Ldouble_ukeu 0.6584 0.4942 0.6584 0.2249 0.2501 0.2250 -0.6681 0.0230 -0.6679 0.3462 0.0001 
Lcivil_dummy 0.6181 0.7559 0.6183 0.2361 0.1846 0.2361 -0.4863 -1.1917 -0.4869 -0.2836 -0.0003 
Lsmesrd 0.9040 0.8221 0.9041 0.0868 0.1463 0.0868 -2.7433 -1.6842 -2.7438 0.2782 -0.0001 
Llargerd 0.0202 0.0277 0.0203 0.0198 0.0269 0.0199 6.8120 5.7583 6.8105 -0.0527 -0.0001 
Lstart 0.0184 0.0183 0.0184 0.0180 0.0180 0.0180 7.1762 7.1811 7.1737 0.0002 -0.0001 
Lyoung 0.1016 0.0938 0.1016 0.0913 0.0850 0.0913 2.6372 2.7861 2.6368 0.0258 -0.0001 
LExtramur_RD_int 0.0033 0.0032 0.0033 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 16.2328 13.6809 17.0108 0.0082 -0.0004 
Lcapexprndint 0.0026 0.0020 0.0026 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 8.4615 13.1888 10.1238 0.0711 -0.0001 
Lsmesrd08 0.3674 0.2455 0.3674 0.2324 0.1853 0.2325 0.5502 1.1826 0.5499 0.2528 -0.0001 
Llargerd08 0.0009 0.0022 0.0009 0.0009 0.0022 0.0009 32.4478 21.4632 32.4556 -0.0393 0.0000 
Lsubsidysmes 0.8523 0.5557 0.8524 0.1259 0.2470 0.1259 -1.9864 -0.2243 -1.9865 0.8361 0.0000 
distance 0.0300 0.0268 0.0300 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0938 0.3760 0.1773 0.1540 0.0001 
herfindahl_index 0.1224 0.1455 0.1224 0.0161 0.0226 0.0161 2.6662 2.0550 3.2025 -0.1820 0.0000 
crisis2008_2010 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 -1 0 
dotcom 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 
pavittd1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 3 0 0 
pavittd2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 0 0 
pavittd3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 
pavittd4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 
2000.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 5 0 0 
2001.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 4 0 0 
2003.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 9 4 0 0 
2004.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 4 0 0 
2005.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 0 0 
2006.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 0 0 
2007.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 -1 0 
2009.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 3 0 0 
2011.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 0 0 
Notes: Number of treated and control observations are 22173 and  2782  respectively. Industry and year dummies are excluded to save space. Mean_Tr: mean value of the covariate for treated firms; Mean_Pre: mean 
value of the covariate in the control group before balancing; Mean_Post: mean value of the covariate in the control group after balancing; Var_Tr: variance of the covariate for treated group; Var_Pre: variance of the 
covariate for the control group before balancing; Var_Post: variance of the covariate for the control group after balancing; Skew_Tr: skewness of the covariate for the treated group; Skew_Pre: skewness of the 
covariate for the control group before balancing; Skew_Post: skewness of the covariate for the control group after balancing; SD_diff_Pre: standardized difference between treated and control group of firms before 
entropy balancing; SD_diff_Post: standardized difference after entropy balancing. The standardized difference in means between the treatment and control group is given by (𝑠1̅ − 𝑠0̅)/√1/2(𝜎𝑠1
2 + (𝜎𝑠0
2 ), where 𝑠1̅ and 
𝑠0̅ are covariate means in the treated and control groups; and 𝜎𝑠1
2  and 𝜎𝑠0
2  are corresponding covariate variances. For other notes, see Table A1.
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